Marine Corps

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ALSO: Six-speed forward, two-speed reverse constant mesh transmission * Standard wide-base 26.5-25, 24-ply tubeless tires all around—optional treads and ply ratings available * Choice of in-seat gasoline starting or direct electric starting * New dry-type air cleaner * Fuel tank capacity — 85 U. S. gallons * Shipping width—10 feet, 10 inches.

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Marine Corps Gazette

MAY 1959 NUMBER 5 VOLUME 43

PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps

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THIS MONTH'S COVER May marks the 47th Anniversary of Marine Corps Aviation. ASgt R. J. DeVeau painted our cover to commemorate the occasion.

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Blue Angels flying Tigers

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Hope for Recon Units

. . . Hats off to BGen Nickerson. His article, "Force Recon-By Land, Sea and Air," was an excellent, concise and complete analysis of the organization, mission and employment for a Force Reconnaissance Company. In fact, of all the articles published in the GAZETTE on reconnaissance units in the Marine Corps in recent years, this is the first to discuss the proper employment of the Force Reconnaissance unit.

It gives encouragement to those with small, still voices that have in the past preached similar philosophies of reconnaissance, and hope that the reconnaissance units will eventually be employed properly with purpose in the future. The stigma that has been prevalent in the past that reconnaissance units are by nature made up of a bunch of "prima donnas" used only for special "snooping and pooping" or combat missions must be avoided in the future. A thorough education of all potential commanders in the true capabilities and limitations of reconnaissance units as set forth in his article would go a long way toward proper employment.

I feel the Force Reconnaissance Company should be a battalion. have a Headquarters Company, an Amphibious Reconnaissance Company, a Para-reconnaissance Company and a Ground Reconnaissance Company. Unit separation and dispersion increases the need for ground reconnaissance at force level particularly under the modern doctrine of amphibious operations. The present organization does not have a satisfactory ground reconnaissance capa-

I am one who believes strongly that para-reconnaissance units should be employed to provide the commander with pre-H-hour reports of enemy activity, obstacles, weather, radiological contaminated areas; however, the strictly pathfinder activity such as technical guidance to and from helicopter landing zones, limited obstacle clearance in the landing areas, emergency communication support and assembly aid to helicopter-landed troops should be the responsibility of the Helicopter Group Commander and divorced from the mission of the Force Reconnaissance unit.



With these organizational changes, improvement in communication facilities, use of electronic aids under development and proper education of all Marines in the value and use of reconnaissance, our commanders will go into battle with eyes and ears wide open.

Yours for more excellent and progressive articles in the GAZETTE similar to BGen Nickerson's.

L+Col C. E. Early

Staff, CINCPACFLT FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

'Chutes or 'Copters?

. . . I have one idea in response to BGen Nickerson's article appearing in the February issue of the GA-ZETTE.

Except in special instances, don't depend on the Force Reconnaissance Company for pathfinding. I am convinced, after studying many documents while attending Senior School last year, every Marine infantry battalion must be able to perform pathfinding in conjunction with any

helicopter squadron. Amphibious landings are complicated enough in command, planning and execution. We must develop and use simple techniques when and where possible. The advantages of helicopter-landed pathfinders, in general, far outweigh parachute delivered pathfinders.

The use of helicopter-landed pathfinders of the BLT/HMR offer the following advantages over parachutists.

The initial dispatch from the LPH, using personnel of the units embarked, reduces the coordination and control problems. A large amount of operational-readied equipment can be landed. Changes in plans and recovery of teams can be speeded up. Helicopters can land pathfinders under more severe surface wind and terrain conditions.

The Force Recon Company is required for such missions as covert pathfinding by parachute in doubtful areas. We should use it only when the situation requires, and develop simple methods of "reducing the unknown" where possible.

LtCol C. D. Ferguson

MCAS, Cherry Point, N. C.

Prestige Evaluated

... Mr. Petry is to be complimented on his fine article entitled "Is Your Prestige Showing?" appearing in the February issue of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. The problem of obtaining and increasing their prestige has faced our noncommissioned officers for many years. However, I have found that those who do practice "self evaluation," following the rules set forth in the article are usually those whose prestige is showing.

With your approval, I will take steps to promulgate this article as a must reading for all noncommissioned officers of this command.

To Mr. Petry again, "well done," for a fine article and I trust that all NCOs will take stock of their prestige as a result of his story and those who find their prestige not to be showing will follow his advice.

LtGen E. A. Pollock

CG. FMFLant Norfolk, Va.

(Continued on page 6)



The GAZETTE will pay \$5.00 for each letter published in Message Center

New hustle and muscle for "Mayday" duty



Unsurpassed visibility from cockpit of SC-130B HERCULES is an aid to spotting ships and planes in distress at sea.



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"Mayday," the international S.O.S. signal, will soon bring SC-130B HERCULES planes to the rescue.

Scheduled to enter service with the United States Coast Guard in the near future, the SC-130B HERCULES is powered by four mighty GM-Allison Prop-Jet engines, developing 16,200 horsepower. Famous for their go-anywhere, haul-anything Feats of Hercules, these Lockheed sky-giants will perform these vital Coast Guard missions:

Intercept-and-escort: The SC-130B has a wide speed range—fast enough to pick up and escort crippled jets to a point of safety. And slow enough to escort slow-speed aircraft.

Search: The SC-130B has speed to get to the search area fast—can stay in the search area a long time.

Rescue: The HERCULES holds world's record for heaviest parachute-extracted drop—30,370 pounds—can therefore easily paradrop rescue gear and survival kits.

Operational command post: The SC-130B's ability to fly low and slow for hours, in any weather, plus its exceptional visibility from cockpit and aft side doors, makes it a superior "on-scene commander" station for prolonged rescue operations at sea.

Helicopter transport and LORAN re-supply: SC-130B's huge cargo compartment is ideal for high-speed transport of helicopters to remote areas—for reassembly and use in search/rescue operations. And its outstanding short-field landing/takeoff capabilities will expedite re-supply of world-wide Long Range Navigation stations.

The Coast Guard SC-130B is one of several versions of this versatile airlift champion now in production for the Armed Forces at Lockheed's Georgia Division, Marietta, Georgia.



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Cock-a-Doodle-Doo

... Just finished reading the February issue of the GAZETTE which included two outstanding articles by BGen Nickerson and by A. L. Petry.

In reference to the anecdote on page 31, knowing AGySgt G. J. Kwiecien personally, I don't believe he would have signed his article "ATSgt G. J. Kwiecien." It is noted, however, that the mistake might have been put into the article to see if your readers were "awake."

AMSgt J. W. Draughon

IstBn 4th Marines (Reinf)
Ist Marine Brigade

Ed: Readers were awake—the proofreader wasn't.

Immunity to Venom

. . . Col Barnes' article in February's GAZETTE could be republished with profit at least 4 times each year. "No Compromise" certainly makes clear, once again, the non-stop, insidious campaign which is raging against us. In the course of the normal life and in the recital of the usual current events we are always aware of Russia and Communists. Familiarity can and does breed contempt and I don't think that we are immune to this sort of reaction. There is the possibility that we are being nationally conditioned, as an individual might be with rattlesnake venom, to develop a tolerance. The tolerance can, in due course, make us amenable to an acceptance of life on our knees-not on our feet where we believe we should stand proudly with freedom.

This conditioning could also be the development of a psychological fear. "Man knows from experience that fear is his most undependable motivation. It is viscous and cancerous. It devours and replaces discernment, intelligence and judgment. It will eventually engulf instead of support any structure of peace which is built upon it. As a deterrent, it can only deteriorate." This is not the fear of combat, which may spur us to feats of unconscious valor, but a long-range erosion of fighting spirit-an erosion which may, in a vein of sweet reasonableness, persuade us to comply as the happiest choice of unpleasant alternatives.

It does seem that we spend an inordinate time in defensive thinking. This is, of course, a part of the Soviet conditioning technique. Let us not get so concerned with negotiations, defensively, that we fail to recognize aggression against us. Each time that we are involved with the Communists the common pattern is that they make claim to something that the free nations have within their protection and concern. We, in the light of treating all claims fairly and squarely, are more worried about whether we will be liked than whether we will be respected (which is a usual difficult choice of command). We all know that respect stems from strength of leadership and character.

One of the overawing things about the effect of the present Communist



campaign is that all public media are crying wolf at every turn. We are beseiged with remedies which are about as effective in this day as Grandma's bear grease for sore throats. The individual citizen is beginning to get the hemmed-in feeling. He doesn't know whether the astute columnist or the President is the better judge of our national defense. What we all need in these days is leadership and, especially, hope. We have the finest principles and way of life in the world. So far, we have not found the common currency which can manage to develop a world-wide value for these things. It may be, since we have tried every other way, that a bit of general toughness along the lines of enlightened self interest is warranted in all of our dealing.

We must know the Communists, recognizing them for what they are in whatever guise, and remain uncompromising and firm if it kills us. I mean this literally and say it in the spirit of Marines and our valiant forefathers.

Col G. H. West

Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Heroics at Walcheren

... In reference to BGen Wendt's very fine article, "Antimissile Defense of a Port" (GAZETTE: Feb '59). It might be of interest to note that after Field Marshal Montgomery's lightning-like drive which culminated in the capture of Antwerp on 4 September 1944, a period of almost 3 months elapsed before the first Allied ships arrived at that port with the vital supplies needed for final victory. An apparent lack of amphibious thinking, and avoidance of the task of clearing the channel to Antwerp, led to a delay which could well have meant disaster for our armies

I believe that GAZETTE readers would be interested in reading of the battles fought to open the channel to Antwerp, and particularly of the vital and heroic part played by the British Royal Marine Commandos, in their landings and operations on Walcheren. I hope that someday the GAZETTE will see fit to publish an article on this subject.

LtGen E. A. Craig, USMC (Ret) 757 Murray Dr. El Cajon, Calif.

Ed: The heroic role of British Royal Marine Commandos at Walcheren was briefly chronicled by Field Marshal Montgomery in his memoirs and by Winston Churchill in Vol. III of his memoirs of WWII. The GAZETTE would welcome for consideration by its Editorial Board articles by readers giving a more detailed account of this sparsely told amphibious operation.

Command List Commended

... In the March issue of the Gazette the editors expressed their desire for reader reaction to the periodic publication of Command Lists of the Fleet Marine Force.

I would like, therefore, to offer my "thanks" to those responsible for adding this feature to the ever-growing list of GAZETTE "worthy" copy.

Command Lists will greatly aid Informational Services personnel, who need such up-to-date information daily as handy references for articles and press releases.

ASSqt J. K. Baird

Camp Lejeune Globe Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Ed: Attention is invited to pages 34, 35, 36, 37 of this issue which contain FMFPac organization and Command List.

(Continued on page 8)

This plastic radome houses a radar antenna constantly scanning the skies to detect the presence of aircraft.

THE
ARCTIC EYE
THAT NEVER
SLEEPS

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This plastic radome houses a radar antenna constantly scanning the skies to detect the presence of aircraft. A line of these radars provides early warning of any threatening approach to the North American continent.

The Distant Early Warning Line is now on perpetual guard duty. Spanning the Arctic from Baffin Island to Alaska, this great system was conceived at the Lincoln Laboratory of M.I.T. and produced under the leadership of Western Electric, the Bell System's manufacturing and supply unit.

But first the DEW Line had to be engineered into a workable system. This was done at Bell Telephone Laboratories.

The obstacles were formidable. Conventional means of communication—telephone poles, cables and even line-of-sight microwave radio—weren't feasible. A complicated system had to be made to operate reliably in a climate so cold that outdoor maintenance is impracticable farther than a few hundred feet from heated habitation.

Whenever possible, Bell Laboratories engineers utilized well-proven art. But as it became necessary, they innovated. For example, they designed and directed the development of a new and superior radar which automatically scans the skies, pinpoints a plane and alerts the operator.

To reach around the horizon from one radar station to another, they applied on a massive scale a development which they pioneered—transmission by tropospheric scatter. Result: at a DEW Line Station you can dial directly a station more than a thousand miles away and converse as clearly as with your home telephone.

The Bell System's contribution to the DEW Line demonstrates again how telephone science works for the defense of America.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM



Southern Fried Chop Suey

... Having been a "screamer" for language training for two years now, I have looked with great interest upon the increasing number of editorials and articles having to do with languages which have been appearing in professional publications during the past 6 months. While agreeing in principle with your article on the subject ("Innocents Abroad," Jan '59), I must take exception to many of the author's thoughts concerning language training for Marine officers.

Maj Jefferson assumes that it is a Marine Corps training problem when indeed it is a problem for the individual. Area understanding and the knowledge of languages other than our own are not a matter of culture. They are, instead, a product of hard work and personal application toward acquiring these mental skills. As such, it behooves the interested man to take necessary action by the output of his own time and energy. In addition to the wartime requirements of the intelligence sections, and the peacetime-wartime desire for liaison personnel, there is a requirement by our Force Reconnaissance personnel for a knowledge of the languages of the countries into which they may parachute on their preD-Day missions involving prolonged activity in an enemy's homeland.

It is quite difficult to assume that our people will be capable of performing and subsisting adequately under such circumstances for a period of months without the ability to converse for their needs with indigenous friendly persons. Recon personnel must then look to the private teaching available, or to correspondence courses for this knowledge.

A responsible officer was heard some months ago propounding the thought that it would be wiser to train accomplished linguists for reconnaissance than vice-versa. What 2-section would or could turn loose one of its rarities? As a result, there exists a vacuum not only in the liaison personnel but in this other important field.

In the proposals put forth by Maj Jefferson he advocates the assignment of commissioned officers with linguistic abilities to areas where their particular capabilities may be best utilized. Are officers fluent in Chinese, Russian, Arabic, Turkish or Japanese to be assigned only to the rather limited duty stations in the geographical areas where these tongues are spoken? Or will they instead be given short refresher courses for a portion of the time they are away from their languages geographically?

As a recent, fortunate assignee to a language school, I cannot claim to have acquired a fluency in my field that will allow me to pass for a native in a foreign country. After extensive questioning of more advanced students and of graduates, however, I wholly believe that the degree of proficiency held by these men would indeed astonish the nonlinguist. Maj Jefferson has possibly not heard the enlisted Marine from Georgia speaking Chinese with an authentic accent, or the lieutenant colonel, in his forties, who is near the top of his class in another lan-



The language school exists; the Corps has quotas for the school and is filling these quotas. Attendance is not limited by a man's age, rank or degree of encumbrance. Performance in the school is a matter of individual determination, as is performance in any other field.

Perhaps those company grade officers now in foreign billets could find the time, energy and money to help themselves and the Corps by timely application to the tongues of their present countries of residence. Over a period of years we would have our pool of linguists for whatever assignment may arise.

ASSgt R. B. MacKenzie Army Language School Monterey, Calif.

Aqui Se Habla Espanol

The foreign language drought which has sered the home grown fields of formal education has left the entire US Armed Forces without the harvest of skilled linguists it has need for. As Maj Jefferson, in his timely article in January's GAZETTE has pointed out, the Marine abroad, in this one aspect, has become an "Innocent Abroad." Unfortunately the required performance of duty in a foreign country or anywhere, for that matter, is not a matter of innocence or sophistication but a more severe one of competence or incompetence.

Quite possibly the HQMC committee might direct some attention to the Marine Corps Reserve Officers scattered about the world in various civilian overseas occupations. Some of these officers have lived 5 and 10 years in their respective countries and not only speak the language but are truly area specialists as a result of their business contacts. A large number of these officers miss the Marine Corps and are unable to participate in any of the normal Reserve activities which the regular establishment encourages. Present regulations do little to utilize these officers and actually indicate preference that these officers leave the area in which they have special skills and go to other countries to train even if they must go outside of the USMC to do so. This may mean that an officer who has lived 4 years in Spain may be allowed to take his active duty for training with the Army in Germany. Or he may get sent to a carrier to serve with a security detachment.


In the light of the lack of people with such experience it would seem more plausible to try to work out something where this same officer could be sent on duty with, let us say, the Spanish Marine Corps or Navy. Or, if such things prove politically unfeasible, with the consulate or embassy in the country where the officer is established. In any country where another Marine officer is stationed the Reserve officer could be interviewed to see if such duty would be of value to both the Corps and the individual concerned. Such a procedure might, in years to come, provide the Corps with at least some individuals who speak the native language of Guinea, Iceland, Mallorca, Tasmania, etc.

Capt T. C. Snell, USMCR Conde del Valle de Suchil, 6 Madrid, Spain

(Continued on page 12)



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Prize Essay Contest



Group I: Field Grade Officers; Civilians

Group II: Company Grade Officers

Group III: Enlisted

Group IV: Members of the Platoon Leaders Class,

Marine Corps Option NROTC, Officer

Candidates Class and NAVCADs.

(Prospective officers may enter Group IV if they have not received their commission at the time the essay is submitted.)

A total of \$2,000.00 will be awarded to the winners of the Marine Corps Association's 1959 Prize Essay Contest. Essays will be judged in the 4 classifications, determined by the status of the contestant (active, inactive or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies or as a civilian). A prize of \$500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group. If no essay entered in the contest is of a sufficiently high standard of excellence, no prize will be awarded in the classification concerned. In the event of a tie, awards may be prorated.

Material dealing with original thinking on military subjects is particularly desired. Historical essays are not solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

In addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention" and be accepted for publication. Those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for general publication in the GAZETTE. Compensation for such articles will be as adjudged by the Editorial Board.

General Rules

- Contestants may write on any subject of military interest but essays may not exceed 5,000 words and they must be original.
- 2. They must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 x 11, and must be submitted in triplicate.
- 3. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay. This phrase shall appear:
 - a) On the title page of the essay.
 - b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the author.
 - c) Above the name and address of the author, inside the identifying envelope.
- Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a sealed envelope marked Prize
 Essay Contest Group (I, II, III, IV as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine
 Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Virginia.
- 5. Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1959.

The copyright of any essay which appears in the GAZETTE is the property of the Marine Corps Association. No liability for the loss, return, judging or reports on any essay submitted will be assumed by the Marine Corps Association or the GAZETTE and the decisions of the Editorial Board will be final. No inquiries regarding essays will be answered until final judgment has been made.

DEADLINE 1 OCTOBER 1959



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Who Let 'em In?

... Since the new rank structure, those of us in "acting" grades have been given notice to get promoted within a certain length of time or else "revert" to an equivalent pay grade. I imagine we will all make the grade but meanwhile there is another problem.

Recently my mother wrote asking what I had done wrong to be made "acting" after being a SSgt for 7 years. Now, if and when I am promoted, and then, perhaps, spend the rest of my active service in the rank of SSgt, dear old Mom is going to think she gave birth to an idiot. Maybe I am one. If so, I blame it all on the strain of having to live with the fact that there are GySgts everywhere — in the messhall, motor pool, PIO, and alas, in the women's barracks.

ASSgt J. R. Fry

USMCRSS, Ottumwa, la.

Text for West Point

ness in granting us permission to reproduce Col Bergren's article "The New Look in Defense Organization" (GAZETTE: Dec '58), which is a lucid description of the new reorganization. In addition to the high utility of the article to our instruction, we are also happy that we can make the students aware of your excellent publication and its high quality.

Please be assured that your enabling us to make this useful study available to our students will contribute materially to their understanding of the Defense organization and, in the ultimate sense, to the success of our course.

Capt R. G. Gard, Jr., USA Social Sciences Department US Military Academy West Point, N. Y.

Incentive Advanced

... The Marine Corps Association was initially open to all officers of the Marine Corps. It has flourished to include all members of the Marine Corps. The top man in each Basic School Class receives an Association sword, and the author of the best term paper at the Naval Academy is presented with a life membership in the Association. The top Marine NROTC student in each

college graduation class is presented a 2-year membership. In previous duty with a NROTC Unit, I learned this was quite an incentive for our students. Participation in marksmanship was boosted, drill was more competitive, and an overall striving to do better was attained.

Marine Corps schools are a possible target of the Association. Would not a 2- or 3-year member-



ship for top members of the classes of selected Marine Corps schools be both an incentive and an Association booster?

A swagger stick would be an ideal award to the top member of the SgtMaj Administration School, in my opinion.

2d Bn, 5th Marines

Ist Mar Div, FMF Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Ed: As a result of this letter, the Secretary-Treasurer has authorized the establishment of an Association award, a swagger stick, to be presented to the top graduate of each class of the Sergeants Major Administration School, MCRD, Parris Island, S. C.

Gibbon after Appomattox

... Congratulations on your selection for publication of the article "Leader of the Iron Men" by Capt Jordan (GAZETTE: Mar '59). BGen John Gibbon is one of the greatest leaders documented in military history.

After the Civil War, Gen Gibbon reverted to the rank of colonel and took an active part in the Indian campaigns in the West. He was the Commanding Officer of the 7th Infantry in the Little Big Horn campaign against Chief Crazy Horse and his medicine man, Sitting Bull. In this campaign he led his column

in an encircling movement, supposedly in coordination with BGen Custer, commanding the 7th Cavalry. We all know the disastrous results of this battle. Gibbon, who carried out his orders, was instrumental in rescuing the surviving scattered companies of the 7th Cavalry. One observer reported, "Gibbon's men marched like Romans."

Although a great leader, and second to none in bravery, there is some doubt as to Gibbon's skill as a tactician. About 14 months after the Custer debacle, Gibbon was soundly trounced by Chief Joseph of the Nez Percés as an attempt was made to halt the tribe's flight to Canada. Gibbon was severely wounded in this action, once again indicating that he was to be found in the thick of any battle, where one would expect to find a leader of his caliber. To Gibbon's credit is the fact that Chief Joseph was never defeated in battles with the US Army.


The traditions, exploits and battle honors of Gen Gibbon and his command live on today. The streamers of the Iron Brigade are now carried by the 128th Infantry, National Guard and the streamers from the Little Big Horn campaign are carried by the 7th Infantry, a regular Army unit.

For readers who are interested in additional information about the "Black Hat" or "Iron Brigade" I would recommend Bruce Catton's Mr. Lincoln's Army, Rufus Dawes' Service With the 6th Wisconsin Volunteers, or John Gibbon's Personal Recollections of the Civil War.

The only portion of the article upon which I would like to make a detailed comment is in regard to the black felt hats. The military writings are not in agreement upon their description and source. Capt Jordan and many other authors and artists portray the hats as a regulation type, looking somewhat like the Western hats of today. Other writers and artists portray them as a short "stovepipe" or opera type hat procured commercially. All are in agreement that the hat was a badge of distinction. It is regrettable that the GA-ZETTE artist's illustrations show the common fatigue or "pillbox forage" cap.

LtCol P. A. Noel, Jr.

1326 Woodley Rd. Falls Church, Va.



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
Please write for color brochure.



A REPLY to ...

By Capt David D. Finne.





GROUP II HONORABLE MENTION

ALEXANDER P. DE SEVERSKY, LAST year published an article [This Week Magazine, 23 Mar'58] entitled "No More Little Wars." In this article he expressed the view that our national defense efforts should be concentrated on a single deterrent force capable of winning an all out nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union and that our national defense policies and the structure of the Department of Defense should be changed accordingly.

Maj de Seversky's position is based on 3 basic conclusions:

1) "We cannot win a limited war fought with traditional forces, regardless of whether conventional or nuclear weapons are used.

2) "We can make limited war impossible if we make clear to the world that we possess a retaliatory force with the strategic scope and tactical flexibility to crush aggression, and so preserve the global status quo.

3) "We can generate a great economic abundance to share with the rest of the world by concentrating on a single deterrent force, and thereby, we can prove that freedom is dynamic and beneficent."

The opinions expressed by this distinguished American prompted the response contained in these pages.

The deterrent imposed by the Strategic Air Command, plus the many disguises worn by Soviet aggression, clearly demonstrate the need for US forces in readiness, capable of fighting local limited wars.

Most Americans concerned with the vital issues of national defense agree that the US Air Force with its powerful Strategic Air Command poses a tremendous deterrent to the desires of the Kremlin's political and military planners. This deterrent is a vital part of our national, or perhaps more correctly stated, our international, defense efforts. However, the ramifications of this deterrent can be oversimplified, sugar coated and sold to the American people for something that they are not, namely the only deterrent

Alexander de Seversky



with which it is necessary to confront the Soviets.

Stated another way, the very existence of the Strategic Air Command's deterrent capability has the effect of fixing the bulk of the Soviet Union's forces in place, resulting in the increased probability of "limited" conflicts. If the Soviets are of the opinion that the results of all-out nuclear war are not worth the risk involved, the only method of territorial aggrandizement left to them is to destroy free governments by subversion or limited military campaigns.

From a military point of view, limited or local wars can be fought and won without resorting to the use of strategic nuclear weapons or even tactical nuclear weapons unless the enemy chooses to initiate their use. Moreover, the US has a force capable of accomplishing just this, should circumstances require its employment. This force is made up of the ships, aircraft and amphibious units of our mighty balanced fleets. These forces are well trained and already on station in areas adjacent to the world's trouble spots.

Before proceeding farther, I think it is necessary to define the terms, "strategic nuclear weapons." In other words when does a tactical H-bomb become a strategic H-bomb? Is this definition determined by the target for which the weapon is employed; or by the size of the weapon; or by the armed service releasing the weapon?

For the purposes of this writing, I shall consider a "strategic nuclear weapon" to mean a weapon released against an industrial or military target outside of the immediate area of operations and a "tactical nuclear weapon" to be one employed within the area of operations to influence the outcome of an immediate battle or engagement, i.e., against enemy troop concentrations, installations or armament.

Maj de Seversky's views with regard to air power are well known and have been dramatically stated;

however, this writer would like to advance the proposition that the existence of Strategic Air Command bases around the perimeter of Soviet influence has the effect of decreasing the possibility of Soviet nuclear attack against the US and our Allies, thereby increasing the probability of local limited conflicts in areas the Soviets desire to penetrate. If this conclusion has any merit, then it logically follows that the US must be prepared to counter Soviet aggression in such areas as the Middle East and Southeast Asia with forces designed to wage limited or local campaigns successfully.

In view of the increased probability of limited war, complete concentration of national defense efforts on a single deterrent force, i.e., the Strategic Air Command, is a dangerous gamble. Such concentration amounts to nothing more than placing all of our defense eggs in one basket.

A look back to June 1950 is sufficient to remind us that the existence of the Strategic Air Command did not prevent the Soviets from sponsoring aggression in Korea nor did SAC prevent the open intervention of Chinese Communist forces in that war. Based on these facts alone, it is realistic to conclude that SAC, powerful as it is, will not prevent the Communists from attempting to penetrate the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

It can be said without fear of successful contradiction that the presence of the US Sixth Fleet is a stabilizing influence in the Mediterranean and that the existence of our powerful naval striking forces (including the combat ready 3dMarDiv on Okinawa) in the Far East fails to give our enemy any measure of comfort.

Maj de Seversky has said that the national expenditure involved in maintaining our armed forces (excluding SAC) is "scattering our energies" and "wasting our money, scientific and industrial effort on all sorts of hardware and secondary projects from invasion barges to aircraft carriers." He has also said that continued effort along these lines will deliver us into national bankruptcy.

If these dire predictions are accurate, it appears that we have two alternatives: a) surrender the Free World to the Soviets piece by piece—a sort of freedom on the installment plan—or, b) risk the awesome prospect of all out nuclear warfare by countering Soviet aggression in under-developed areas with H-bombs.


Plainly, neither of these courses of action is very attractive or necessary. The US is far from a bankrupt nation, and even if maintaining our balanced armed forces would bankrupt us, I am sure that most Americans would rather be broke than dead.

Allow me to present what I consider to be a more suitable alternative, compared to those already considered, should the Soviets decide to release their "volunteers" to "liberate" a Middle Eastern or Southeast Asian nation.

First, we could immediately display a "show of force" in the area concerned using our powerful attack carrier striking forces and our missile carrying cruisers and submarines. This method of dramatically



Capt Finne enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1945 and was commissioned in 1951. He has served as a Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer with the 2dBn, 5th Marines; Asst G-1, 1st MarDiv; CO, Recon Co, 1st MarDiv; CO, MD, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt; Research Asst, Advanced Base Problem, MCS, Quantico. At the present time he is an Instructor, Infantry, Landing Force Instruction Team, MCS, Quantico.



Sinew of the balanced fleet

illustrating the presence of counter force is primarily the Theodore Roosevelt "Speak softly but carry a big stick" technique. I believe this technique is as effective in many instances today, as it was in TR's time. If this display failed to persuade the enemy that he had made a serious tactical blunder then this same force can commence attacks against him using carrier-based jet bombers for heavy high explosive air strikes. Our attack carriers can launch these aircraft from distances of over 1,000 miles at sea. Later neutralization strikes can be launched from 500 miles at sea. Once air superiority has been achieved, our fleet can defend that superiority with aircraftlaunched missiles and high explosive surface-to-air missiles.

Our fast, mobile, versatile amphibious troops can ignore hydrographic obstacles by using the vertical envelopment technique. These troops can be launched from helicopter carriers 100 miles at sea, to seize inland objectives. By employing only conventional ordnance, they can seize and secure an area large enough to provide an operat-

ing base for a larger SEATO, NATO or UN force within weeks or even days.

The procedure I have outlined avoids the massing of amphibious and naval gunfire ships, thereby eliminating a tempting target for enemy nuclear weapons. The extensive use of helicopters, carrying troops well trained in the vertical envelopment technique, gives us the advantage of choosing the time and place for the landing and assault phase of the operation.

Visionary? Not in the least. The US Marine Corps and the US Navy possess the capability to conduct such an operation and each phase of the preparation and assault has been rehearsed and tested in training exercises.

What about the use of nuclear weapons? The Attack Carrier Striking Force and the Landing Force have a nuclear capability and, should the restrictions regarding the use of these weapons be lifted, they will be employed in accordance with pre-determined operating procedures. The use of nuclear weapons against cities, housing a friendly

population, can be avoided because our amphibious troops have the capability to seize built-up areas with conventional armament.

Maj de Seversky's desire to establish a Fortress America, launching air and space attacks from the North American continent and establishing an "insuperable electronic nuclear defense which can decimate the enemy" is visionary and certainly not possible within the foreseeable future. In addition, it sounds as expensive as the conventional "hardware" he recommends we scrap.

Maj de Seversky's proposed reorganization of the Defense establishment into a "Department of Air and Space" with subordinate bureaus of "auxiliary units" is not a very practicable suggestion at this time. Further study of this recommendation may result in the opinion that such an arrangement would place considerable military power in the hands of one person or one group of persons thereby endangering our free institutions. It is also possible that concentration on air and space has serious military drawbacks, for there are many military theoreticians who believe that he who controls the ground controls the air above it in the missile age.

I submit that in addition to the Strategic Air Command, the Balanced Fleet with its versatile Landing Force, constitutes a real deterrent to communist aggression. In no measure can we justify releasing strategic nuclear weapons against civilian populations or dropping high yield nuclear bombs on friendly nations in response to the often disguised Communist aggressive techniques. If the US were to rely on this method of countering Soviet aggressive desires, membership in NATO and SEATO would be abandoned by member nations on the double. Certainly our Allies would look elsewhere for cultural and scientific leadership if all the US could offer them was the possibility of defending their nations against Soviet aggression by dropping "friendly" strategic nuclear bombs on their homelands.

Reliance on the Strategic Air Command's deterrent is not enough and it is for this reason that the concept of balanced armed forces must prevail.



-these are just a few of many reasons why train travel is best for the services.


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TAO plus Kou

Be Capt Michael E. Spice

WHERE IS THE ENEMY? WHAT IS the other side of the ridge? What is the situation up ahead? These and many other questions have confronted the unit commander, either in combat or on field exercises.

A unit commander formulates his course of action based upon what is known and what is unknown. Prior to making the decision however, it is the commander's responsibility to exert the utmost effort in solving for the unknown parts of the tactical equation. Anything less results in casualties in combat and tactically unsound practices in training.

Stop and think. How many times have you as a commander or as a troop leader, thought about calling upon the Tactical Air Observation Section (TAO) for assistance in solving your tactical unknowns? The answer, it is feared, is seldom if at all

Perhaps the main reason that the TAO Section has been but slightly utilized is because some of our leaders today are unaware of its existence and mission. Or perhaps, the lessons learned in WWII and in Korea about the usages, advantages and the limitudes of tactical air observation have been forgotten by both the nir observer and the Marine on the general sections.

Regardless of what the reason may be for the lack of utilization, now is the time to learn, understand or reacquaint ourselves with this most important capability of projecting our observation into the "unobservable." In this current phase of evolution of the doctrine and the tactics of modern separation, the services of the TAO have become more valuable than ever before.

Very briefly let us examine the who, what and where of the TAO Section. Under the present T/O, the TAO Section operates as part of the Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) when the squadron is under the operational control of a MarDiv. The observation personnel are officers of the division attached to Head-quarters Battalion. These personnel are under the immediate control of a Senior Observer and the entire section is controlled by the Division

Division Asc Officer.

The duries of the section are: to make observations from aircraft in order to obtain interchation regarding strength disposition, activities and capabilities of chemic forces and location of chemic menaltations; to observe and repair on the location and activities of from the forces to adjust articles the or exempt course to make these cause of the sections.

prepare sketches, or take aerial photos as a basis for later study; to adjust naval gunfire during the preparatory phase of amphibious operations; to communicate from aircraft to ground units by radio or other signaling means; to report results of fire and enemy counter effort including troop movement; to identify and indicate ground targets to air support planes; and to observe or photograph friendly installations to determine effectiveness of camouflage.

In order to accomplish this mission, TAOs have flown in just about every type of Marine and Navy airplane and helicopter. Normally, however, the TAO does his work from the rear seat of the OE-2, frequently called a "grasshopper." The OE-2 is equipped with sufficient radio communications to net with other planes, ground installations and all levels of command down to and including the company level.

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Excluding the mechanics of air requests, which normally would be handled by the unit's Air Liaison Officer (ALO) or Forward Air Controller (FAC), let us examine, within the pale of current doctrine, those services of the TAO which are available and the method used to secure the desired services.

Keeping in mind that normally a request for air observation should be relayed through the unit's ALO, it does not mean that if in case of an



Capt Spiro was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1951. With the 1st Mar Div in Korea, he served as: Mortar Plt Ldr; Order of Battle Officer; and Tactical Air Observer. After two years with the Foreign Service Training Program, American Embassy, Tokyo, he returned to the 1st Mar Div where he served as CO, Company B, 7th Marines and S-3, 1st Bn, 7th Marines. He is now 161, 56th Infantry Co, Bellingham, Wash.

emergency or loss of contact with the ALO, you cannot receive air observation support. Quite the contrary. Any TAO worth his salt will keep his PRC-10 on his assigned frequency (prior to an operation, your ALO will inform you as to the call sign and frequency). He will monitor this frequency until assigned a specific task for a particular unit. It is at this time that the TAO will switch to the tactical net of the unit he is supporting.

Operating under the demands of present day tactics, separated units must cover greater distances in shorter periods of time, without the aid of many of the supporting units, vehicles and weapons used in the past. As tactics evolve farther along this line, the vulnerability of ground units increases proportionately. Consequently, the requirement for security during all phases of offensive and defensive warfare also increases. This is the area in which more reli-

ance must be placed on observation from the air.

During this present period of constant training, it is of paramount importance that the techniques employed be no less realistic than the desired tactical objectives. Now, more than ever before, is the time when the techniques of aerial observation, if known and properly utilized, will pay great dividends. Specifically, tactical air observation can be employed:

1) When your movement is into an area in which the location and strength of the enemy is doubtful or unknown. The TAO can make his reconnaissance as general or as detailed as required.

2) When your movement is into an area that is not well mapped or when such natural phenomena as rain or snow makes continued movement along a planned route doubtful. Air observation reports can advise continuance or alternate courses





and can supply an air dropped sketch or overlay as required.

3) When planning an attack or defense, the TAO can supply low altitude vertical and oblique photographs of the area within a short period of time—as little as one hour and seldom over twenty-four hours.

4) When widely separated, present organic communications are often ineffective and the TAO can be used as a "radio relay" or can locate subordinate or parent units as required.

5) During an offensive or defensive engagement, the TAO can render position, progress and situation reports covering a wide area using immediately accessible means of communication.

Another important use for the TAO is assisting with close air support missions. In the days when a battalion operated in a narrow zone

of action or defended along a comparatively narrow front, the FAC was readily available to assist with and, observation and enemy fire permitting, control strike aircraft. This has changed.

It can easily be seen that as units separate, the effectiveness of the FAC, as a controller, is decreased. Yet the necessity for close air support increases in proportion to the amount of separation.

Here is where the TAO and his pilot can team up and function as a Tactical Air Controller Airborne (TACA). As the TAO has positive communications with the strike aircraft and with the ground units and as the TAO has excellent observation of the target area, he can render immediate and accurate control, if so desired by the ground unit. This does not imply that the TAO should assume the functions of the FAC.

To the contrary, the TAO is there in order to render any assistance that the FAC may need. However, if the time-space factor between the FAC and the unit in need of air support precludes immediate attention or if because of the ground situation, the FAC cannot advantageously position himself and his communications, the TAO functioning as a TACA should be utilized.

Another factor to keep in mind is that at the time when the commander is briefing his subordinates on the forthcoming operation, it should be of value to have a TAO sitting in on the briefing. If for some reason this is not possible, then the unit's ALO should make every attempt to call on and brief the TAO Section. Although this requires a little more effort and coordination, once the TAO understands the ground plan, he will be able to render his available services in a more rapid and intelligent manner.

It is not the intent of this article to give the impression that the TAO is infallible and that the infantry units cannot operate without his services. However, if proper utilization is made of the aerial observation capability and if responsible air observers will go back and study the techniques developed during periods of recent combat, it should be possible to eradicate from our present FMF training exercises such malpractices as skylining communications, moving units deep into areas which have not, and are not being, reconnoitered and attacking "one sided" objectives. By making the most of the TAO Section, we will have gone far in solving many of today's tactical and technical difficulties. US MC

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Oops, Wrong Number

AFTER SPENDING QUITE SOME TIME on the subject of the misuse of telephones in the First Sergeant's and CO's offices, the Battery Gunnery Sergeant was about to dismiss the formation. There had been a constant jangling of telephones with calls from wives, girl friends and buddies.

Emphasizing the need for correcting the situation the Gunny growled: "These phones are for official use only and for emergencies. And the next time some knucklehead . . . "

At that point, the Battery clerk appeared on the porch of the barracks.


"What is it, Jenkins?" the Gunnery Sergeant asked.

"A message for you, Gunny, but it can wait," answered the clerk.

Thinking it might be important, he yelled back, "What's the message, Jenkins?"

"Your wife called and wants you to pick up the laundry on the way home," was the reply.

AGySgt A. M. Courteau



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In 1959 . . . watch for the HILLER ROTORCYCLE!







JUST WHAT DOES COMBAT AIR transport support mean? The most meaningful answers to this question will come from someone who has benefited from this support or suffered from the lack of it. Ask one of the men whose life was saved by an air evacuation to a hospital. Ask a commanding officer who received precious supplies from an air drop which meant the difference between victory and defeat. Ask the pilot who has landed a transport plane on an isolated strip surrounded by enemy troops. All of these people

can tell you what a factor air transport support is in the morale and strategy of winning wars. There was a time when air transport was looked upon as a miraculous rarity which just happened out of the clouds. Nowadays it is counted on as an integral part of all around military preparedness.


This is an attempt to trace the evolution of the combat air transport concept from its infantile stages to the high state of development which it has reached today.

The first phase of this support

Marine Corps Gazette • May 1959







was employed early in the history of Marine Aviation when observation type aircraft dropped food to small combat patrols during WWI. Again in the Haitian fracas of 1919, transport service of a type was performed. During the Nicaraguan campaign of 1928, patrols of company size operating in mountainous terrain were supplied by air drops. It was here that the then 1stLt Christian F. Schilt earned the Medal of Honor for his performance of air support and air rescue. Ten times he landed and took off from a short main street at Quilali bringing in a replacement

commander and medical supplies, and air evacuating a total of 18 wounded men to Ocotal. From there they were flown to Managua in the Marines' first Fokker biplane.

Aerial drops were already being used to deliver pay to the troops. The record volume at this time was delivery of 3,000 pounds of subsistence stores in one day. This figure seems pitifully small in comparison to the phenomenal tonnage which can be airlifted to our ground forces by the transport squadrons of our modern air wings. But these were the planes and these were the men

that laid the groundwork for the great role which air transport was to play in WWII. The old Fokkers, Ford Trimotors and Curtiss Condors were the predecessors of the giant transports of today and the men who flew them went on to become well known names in the aviation world.

Marine transport units have had their ups and downs in proportion to the increases and decreases in the size of the Marine Corps as a whole. During practically every emergency this type of support has been fully utilized. Up to the early part of



Ford Tri-motor transport



Bellanca small transport



Curtiss R5C



Douglas R5D

WWII the only Marine air transport units were utility squadrons similar to VMJ-2, later redesignated as VMJ-252 and still later as VMR-252. This squadron was the first to see action in WWII and to supply outlying bases in the Pacific. Stationed at Ewa on 7 Dec 1941, the squadron was almost wiped out by the Japanese sneak attack. All but one of its planes, an R3D-2 under repairs at Ford Island, were destroyed on the ground.

On 2 June, two days prior to the Japanese attack on Midway, this remaining transport was dispatched to take 10 PBY gunners to replace crewmen who had been shot up tracking the Japanese fleet. In addition to the passengers, .50 caliber incendiary ammunition was crammed aboard until no more space was left. The plane was so overloaded that the pilot took off from Ewa's short runway at 0230 in the morning leaving his co-pilot behind. Despite the fact that enemy planes were active over most of the 1180 mile route to Midway, the pilot completed the round trip flight twenty-one and a half hours later.

On many occasions in the second war, the Army and Navy found themselves calling on Marine air transports for combat resupply. The large cargo doors of the Marine aircraft were capable of admitting cumbersome spare parts and other material urgently needed in combat areas. It became evident during the first part of the war that two utility squadrons with their limited number of transport aircraft would hardly be adequate for the tremendous job which lay ahead. By the end of the war the transport capability of Marine Aviation had expanded into a total of four transport groups consisting of three squadrons each. A distinct designation, VMR, which is still in use today, was given to transport squadrons in place of the old utility designation, VMJ.

Two groups were organized principally for transport work on 1 March and 1 June respectively. They were MAG-15 and MAG-25. Both were formed at Camp Kearny, California. Their formation was well timed, for that summer the 1st MarDiv was engaged in combat on Guadalcanal and it had become increasingly difficult to supply them

by sea. Air transport was the only answer.

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MAG-15 served as a training group for transport, observation and photographic squadrons, during the first two years of the war, lending valuable support to MAG-25 which had been deployed in August of 1942. The first echelon in the deployment of MAG-25 consisted of 13 R4Ds which took off for the South Pacific from the Naval Air Station at San Diego. The elements of the group immediately entered into the business of combat supply to the units engaged in the fighting on Guadalcanal, starting with the September 5th delivery of 3,000 pounds of precious and scarce commodities to Henderson Field. This major airborne supply job made history for the Marine Corps. The following day the pilot took a plane load of wounded to New Caledonia. This was the first of many such shuttle runs: in with the supplies, and out with the casualties. A month after their arrival in the area, these squadrons were performing constant support missions for the hard pressed Marine Division as the Japanese were massing for their all out assault against our ground forces. Henderson Field soon became the scene of incessant transport activity and many units who had exhausted their supplies were visited by these hedge-hopping transports.

Flying "around-the-clock" schedules in planes that were in constant need of service and repair, the pilots and crews of MAG-25 kept the lifeline open despite terrific opposition. No fighter planes could be spared from their ground support missions to escort the fatbellied transports up from New Caledonia. Japanese fighters had almost unlimited freedom of the sky, and the unpredictable Pacific weather presented a further hazard to the overtaxed R4D "Skytrains." "Security in the clouds" was their motto as they flew through strafing attacks and taxied up and down the strip at Henderson Field in the midst of bombing attacks. Their only arms and armor: courage and superior flying ability.

Commander Air Southern Pacific ordered the formation of South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command (SCAT) on 24 November 1942. MAG-25 became the nucleus of this combat support unit, utiliz-



Col Yeaman enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1934 and was designated a Naval Aviator in 1937 after completing flight training. He has commanded Service Squadrons 25 and 51, MAG-51, VMR-152, MWSG-37 and MWSG-27. In addition he has served as: Marine Liaison Officer, Joint Task Force 1 (Bikini Atom Bomb Tests, 1946); Asst Chief of Staff, G-4, AirFMFPac; and Member, Strategic Plans Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ing Marine Squadrons VM J-152, 153 and 252 along with the Army's 13th Troop Carrier Squadron. The Marine group staff was used for the administrative, maintenance and logistic support of this composite unit. Thousands of pounds of food, clothing, ammunition and other drastically needed supplies were flown into Guadalcanal to support our forces when shipping could not be used safely. Replacement personnel were flown in by these aircraft and the wounded were evacuated to hospital ships and aid stations at Espiritu Santo and New Caledonia on their return trip. Throughout the campaigns at Bougainville, New Georgia, Munda and New Guinea, a constant stream of vital equipment, medical supplies and ammunition, flowed northward under the direction of this famous SCAT organization. A typical mission was one at New Georgia where the Marine Raiders were trapped on the northern tip of the island with supplies running low. Their only aid had to come from the clouds. Several transports were loaded with the most vital resupply items. Flying low over the jungle, the Skytrains dumped their para-packs on the prearranged positions where they were gratefully received by the hardpressed ground forces. Again and again, from the Solomons through Bougainville, Iwo Jima, Saipan and Okinawa, in each of our many amphibious operations, air drop was the sole means of support for the units which became isolated. Paratroopers were also trained and utilized for a while during this period.

SCAT routes stretched more than 6,000 miles, servicing practically the entire South Pacific until dissolved in February 1945. As the American offensive shifted to the Central Pacific, other groups similar to SCAT

were organized. One such group was the Central Pacific Combat Air Transport Service (CenCATS) which was organized at Samoa in November 1943. Some of the elements of MAG-25 which had been with SCAT were shifted to CenCATS.

Douglas twin-engine R4Ds proved satisfactory for the operations from New Zealand through the New Hebrides chain all the way north to Green Island. As the scene shifted, the Curtiss (R5C) Commandos were added to the lineup beside the Douglas Skytrain. The Commando had become well known for its famous over-the-hump flights between India and China. Its additional payload and longer range was better suited to the need of this front and soon it had almost completely replaced the R4Ds in the transport groups. However, within its limitations, the Douglas Skytrain has served brilliantly down to this very day while most planes of its vintage have been surveyed out of the picture. The original models of both the Skytrain and the Commando are still being used by military and commercial carriers throughout the world.

On 1 April 1944, MAG-15 arrived at Apamama and became part of Transport Air Group (TAG), the successor to CenCATS, flying routes from Samoa to Engebi with stops at Funafuti, Noumea, Tarawa, Makin, Majuro, Kwajalein, Roi and Eniwetok. The Army, Navy and Marines operated TAG stations. The planes and personnel were, however, about 70 per cent Marines and 30 per cent Army.


The TAG planes were the first transports to arrive in Saipan. On D plus 7, two R5Cs escorted six F-61 Night Fighters into Saipan while it was still under fire. This flight had taken off from Eniwetok



Fairchild R4Q



Troops board R4Q



Loading truck in hurricane

after a sketchy briefing on weather and enemy opposition. Flying blindly into the battle zone, the squadron commander led the fighters safely into Saipan. Facing the imminent danger of an enemy attack, the transports unloaded their cargo and took scores of casualties aboard for air evacuation to Eniwetok.

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A very short time later over 120,-000 pounds of vitally needed supplies were transported from this newly won strip at Saipan to Tinian and the wounded were evacuated on the return trips. TAG, with VMR-252 bearing the brunt, was the only air transport group to remain active throughout the entire Saipan-Tinian campaign. This group established a record by evacuating 1800 casualties without a loss of one patient. It also became the main source of supply when the Peleliu and Iwo Jima operations got underway. It was on the newly captured strip at Iwo Jima that one pilot made a landing while the battle was still raging at one end of the field. A downwind landing was necessary to avoid heavy ground fire at the opposite end.

The next and last stop for TAG, later known as the "Tokyo Express," was Okinawa where over 10,000 para-packs with grenades, mortar shells, rations and water were dropped to troops in forward positions. This tactic was called for because of impassable land communication. Prior to this island being secured, many supply runs were made into Yontan during the toughest moments of the action. The group shifted its major operations to the Ryukyus when, on 8 April 1945, it was assigned the task of spraying Okinawa and Ie Shima with DDT. The Marine Transport Squadrons VMR-252, 253, 353 and 952, and the Army's 9th Troop Carrier Squadron, were the units which made up TAG at that time.

In addition to flying over 200 million passenger miles in 21 months without loss or injury to a single passenger, TAG established the record of escorting more than 400 fighter planes into Okinawa. The best example of this type of mission was the 1810 mile flight, from Ulithi via Guam and Iwo Jima to Okinawa, during which VMR-952 escorted 24 Avengers of VMTB-232.

In February 1945, when SCAT ceased to function, MAG-25 planes had commenced operations to Mindanao via Morotai, and by May of 1945, Davao was included but the group headquarters remained at Bougainville.

TAG, on the other hand, folded its tent around September 1945. MAG-15, now composed of H&HS-15, SMS-15, VMR-353 and 953, was flying from Ewa, Hawaii all the way to Tientsin, Peiping and Tsingtao to support the Marine ground forces which had moved up from Guam into North China. The transport group shouldered the entire air supply responsibility in that area, desperately trying to avoid the Chinese Civil War. Every type of assignment was carried out including para-pack supplies to isolated cease-fire teams as well as UNRRA mercy missions. These squadrons were using R5Cs, which were the only transports available in North China for a considerable length of time.

At the completion of WWII our Marine transports were reduced to two groups of three squadrons each. Of the six squadrons, four of them were equipped with the twin engine R5Cs and two with the four-engine Douglas R5Ds. The R5D is better known to many as a DC-4 Skymaster in use by both military and civilians. This type of aircraft became well known in the service by its use in both NATS (Naval Air Transport Service) and MATS (Military Air Transport Service). The Berlin Airlift was an outstanding demonstration of the logistic support capability of the Douglas Skymaster. Although born out of necessity, this Berlin Airlift was also an excellent example of military preparedness, and specifically transport preparedness, being used in a positive way to preserve the peace.

MAG-15 started receiving its R5Ds in February of 1946. In September 1945, VMR 952 and 353 assisted in the move of the 2d MAW units to Omura and Yokosuka, Japan. After the heavy winter rains the roads became poor and impassable to the extent that communications and supply became a major problem. Three R5Cs were utilized for mail-cargo and passenger service until the four R5Ds hopped over to replace them. Despite unsatisfactory



Jumpers leave an R4D

landing fields and bad weather, close liaison between the ground units was established. An average of 66,000 pounds of cargo and 750 passengers per month was carried by the aircraft attached to the 2d MarDiv. Two days were saved on mail delivery and air evacuations were expedited, thus giving a big boost to troop morale.

Before long MAG-25 was decommissioned and MAG-15 was changed to a fighter group. During the period that followed, one of the R5D squadrons (VMR-352) continued to operate from Ewa, Hawaii, on the 60-hour round-trip "Cannon Ball Express" to Peiping, Tsientsin and Tsingtao, China. Everyone along the equatorial route knew the ability and record of these Marine transports which were carrying the aircraft spare parts, personnel and other supplies on this extensive haul. For the period that VR-8 was in Europe on the Berlin Airlift, this same squadron took over their MATS runs between Honolulu and Guam.

Spring of 1949 brought the move of AirFMFPac from Hawaii to Southern California, followed shortly by the Marine Transport Squadron VMR-352. Provisional MAG-25 was then formed. It was made up of a headquarters squadron (provisional) with a Class "C" maintenance facility plus the two R5D squadrons—VMR-152 and VMR-352—now

stationed at El Toro.


The need and usefulness of transport operations continues although it is often necessary to cut down on the size. Many who are unfamiliar with these needs are forced by reductions in the budget to deactivate or reduce the number and size of the transport units. The spring of 1950 was an excellent example of this. Orders were received for the reduction of the aircraft complement of the R5D squadrons from 18 down to 15 aircraft each. This one reduction factor could have made us sadly short of transport support for Korea.

A very few days after the outbreak of hostilities there, the Chief of Naval Operations called for a conference at San Diego. It was attended by the major commands of the area. The Commanding General of AirFMFPac at El Toro returned from this conference with the alert for all available aircraft capable of airlift.

At this time the majority of our Marine transport aircraft were on the East coast performing their annual mission of transporting reserves to and from their summer training course. Six R5Ds remained at El Toro due to the nearness of their date of transfer to overhaul. All of these, however, were making daily shuttle flights hauling thousands of pounds of critical supplies and parts from San Francisco and San Diego to El Toro for MAG-33 which was



C-130 "Hercules"



Cargo ramp of the C-130

mounting out for the Korean area.

When the CG, AirFMFPac called and asked what could be done in answer to the CNO's request for all available Navy and Marine transport, he was told that six R5Ds could be deployed within 24 hours and at least two sent overseas per day until all had returned from the East coast.

At this time the commanding officers of MAG-25, VMR-152 and VMR-352 were on the East Coast with the Reserve Air Lift. A telephone call started the immediate return of the R5Ds to El Toro. Checks were pulled and these planes were soon en route to Hawaii and Korea. July 15th marked the first departure from El Toro and July 18th the first landing in the Far East. The only other transport type aircraft available in the Marine Corps at the time were a few assigned to wings and group headquarters plus the squadrons of Curtiss Commandos (R5C-1s) based on the East Coast. These R5Cs were in the process of being replaced by the new Fairchild Packet (R4Q-1).

Again the need for air transport became apparent, and "Combat Cargo" was formed in Korea. The Navy found it necessary to form new air logistic support units now known as "FLOGWINGS" (Fleet Logistic Wings) to replace the Naval Air Transport Service (NATS) which had been already integrated into Military Air Transport Service (MATS). These "FLOGWINGS" were to operate in the Atlantic and Pacific and give much needed support to the Fleet Units in those areas (on routes not served by "MATS").

The use of airlift was to be the key to the air supply phases of the first amphibious invasion of Korea, and no one knew then how important it was to be. For example, during the period 15 July to 30 September, the ten planes in VMR-152's forward echelon carried 2,958 passengers, 184,291 pounds of mail, 991,774 pounds of cargo, over 976,-160 miles. During the same period, plans were being made for the landing at Inchon where our troops overran Kimpo airfield. This was also the key to air control of the Seoul area and the only field providing the facilities for air supply. It is believed that this is the first time in

combat history that a complete airhead was set up with air landed material.

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
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Marine R5Ds and Air Force C-119s lifted the materials necessary for the operation of this airhead. These planes carried tents, food, kitchens, lighting equipment, communication equipment, trucks and jeeps. Tons of ammunition and bombs were so urgently needed that they were loaded directly from the transport plane to the bomb racks and ammunition trays of our Marine fighter planes.

The Commanding General of the 1st MAW at this time expressed his attitude toward development of airlift in these terms: "These operations have demonstrated to me that airlift capabilities must be explored fully in planning all future operations. Any aviation organization designed for operations in the field that does not have transportation capable of supplying its immediate needs is in the horse and buggy stage." In a few short months he was to have an even higher regard for the ungainly workhorses of the cargo air fleet. The transport squadrons performed feats unknown before in combat operations by transport aircraft. The long supply trains of other wars were absent and in their stead the big planes roared in with their valuable loads. There, in this early stage of advance, one of the major miracles of the war was renewed. Again, casualties, which in other days had been inched back from the front lines in torturous and difficult stages, filled the planes which otherwise would have flown out empty. Given preliminary attention in field hospitals, or even simple first aid by the roadside, the wounded were flown to safe, well equipped hospitals and specialists in Southern Korea or direct to Japan within a few hours. Medical experts commented on the excellent condition of home-coming casualties from Korea as compared to casualties in former wars. It has been found that air evacuation can be accomplished with one-twentieth of the medical personnel required by surface evacuation.


Valuable aircraft were being battered by unskilled loading and unloading. They landed in rough fields that wouldn't have been con-



One of the transport's many uses



Transports for Reserve airlift



Loading an aircraft engine



Workhorse of WW II (Pacific)

sidered for an emergency sit-down back home, and did so day in and day out. The Republic of Korea Division sifted up the east coast and captured Wonsan, where heavy mining of the harbor prevented landing of our troops or seaborne supplies. The story of Kimpo was repeated and a complete air base unit was airlifted into Wonsan within two days. A total of 115 tons of supplies, ammunition and gasoline began pouring into the airport every day to support the drive northward toward Yonpo and Hamhung.

On 14 November the Eighth Army and X Corps began what normally would have been the final clean-up of North Korean troops. The last campaign was being air-supplied almost entirely when the boom was lowered and the Seventh Chinese Army Corps moved across the Yalu and into position for their attack down the Korean peninsula.

As these Chinese units moved into the attack, a mass withdrawal was begun. Although an almost desperate fight, it was carried out by battlewise troops and had little resemblance to the even more desperate rear-guard action of the previous summer. Pinpoint resupply was urgently needed and delivered. The major effort, however, became the evacuation of wounded in the round-the-clock operations centered at the airfields of Sinanju and Pyongyang.



R4Q landing

This task of supplying offensive units reversed itself into the grim one of evacuating the wounded and of air dropping supplies to isolated units. On the day of the intervention of the Chinese Communists, our Marine R5Ds were operating into air bases as far north as Sinanju. It took a smoothly operating organization to handle the even more difficult task of withdrawal.

On 29 November, when all aircraft were diverted to Sinanju for the final all out effort to remove our wounded, more than 700 men were flown out in less than 24 hours. The following day Sinanju was abandoned. One of VMR-152's R5Ds was the last transport to leave the airstrip and was under heavy small arms fire by Chinese attackers moving in on the field.

A majority of the 5,248 casualties airlifted in November were transported in the last week of the month. This figure includes individual casualties who were often staged several times in the process of returning them to general hospitals in Japan.

The principal air supply base in the area was now Yonpo, where a Fifth Air Force Fighter Wing and our Marine Air Wing were operating. These bases were to be evacuated and all of the transportable supplies were to be airlifted to rear bases. Fortunately, the veteran 61st Troop Carrier Group of Berlin Airlift fame had arrived in the theater for assignment to Combat Cargo a week earlier and they bolstered the evacuation fleet in the five day retrograde operation.

It was also at this time that the Marines were carving out a cow pasture strip near Hagaru-ri. A vitally needed six-section treadway bridge, believed to be the largest single piece of equipment ever delivered by air, was dropped to our Marine troops by the Air Force to assist them in their fight out of the Chosin Reservoir area. The flexibility of transport service has seldom been better illustrated.

Transport aircraft were urgently needed all over North Korea. Every available aircraft of any type or command was commandeered. The Marine R5Ds of VMR-152 were able to take out 2,406 tons of equipment and personnel from Yonpo while temperatures sank below the zero level. More than 4,000 personnel were taken out while elements of the Army's Third Division held a thin perimeter around the field. Naval vessels lobbed in shells to protect the field and its defending troops. Planes were landing and taking off at three minute intervals, breaking the space only when the control tower cleared the area due to artillery fire.

The outcome was in no small measure dependent upon the air-

dropped supplies and casualty evacuation by the Marine and Air Force transports. (Note: the R5Ds of VMR-152 originally assigned on TAD to the 1st MAW, were put under operational control of the Combat Cargo Command at the request of the 5th Air Force.)

On 6 December a new innovation was instituted creating something new in tactical history. What is normally a ground based Tactical Air Direction Center was ingeniously made into an Airborne TADC. Using one of VMR-152's R5Ds, additional VHF radio sets were placed in the aircraft with the extra antennas routed out the ventilator holes in its cabin windows. These flights were of 13 to 14 hours duration, taking off with below minimum ceilings and visibility, in freezing weather before dawn and returning after dark. The 1st MAW received the Distinguished Unit Citation from the US Army for the historic role of close air support missions flown by its personnel utilizing this improvised airborne TADC which contributed so much to the breakout from Hagaru southward. The TADC ceased to function on the 11th of December when control of all close air support passed on to the 1st Wing Air Defense Section. The forward echelon of VMR-152, with very limited flight personnel available, flew 24 hours a day during this critical thirteen day



C-130 loading bulk cargo

period making as many as three round trip (6 hour) flights per aircraft per day between Japan and Korea.

The need for transports continued throughout the remainder of the Korean conflict, eventually requiring the additional assignment of a complete squadron of Fairchild Packets (R4Os).

From 1 November to 24 December 1950, VMR-152 operated into various emergency strips under adverse weather conditions and transported over five million pounds of urgently needed food, supplies and ammunition from Japan to Korea. This squadron evacuated over four thousand casualties without an accident or the loss of a single life. Several pilots received Air Medals and Distinguished Flying Crosses for their heroism, achievement and meritorious service.

In peacetime, the efforts of our transport squadrons are often directed to humanitarian causes. This was demonstrated when MAG-25 answered the need with the airdrop of 153 tons of food and clothing to thousands of Mexicans in the Tampico area after hurricane Hilda hit in September 1955.

Although our hopes for world peace are always high, it is obvious that a very unsettled condition exists

today. If someone makes a misstep in diplomacy and knocks the chip off the wrong shoulder at an inopportune time, we will find ourselves in the middle of another war. We nearly had one on our hands in the fall of 1956 over the Suez problem. At that time, MATS was busy evacuating approximately 10,000 Hungarians from Europe to the US. Several neutral nations were called upon to provide transport airlift for the UNEF (Police Force) into Suez. During this same period, while all other transport aircraft were tied up with the several missions mentioned above, the Moroccan and French differences around Port Lyautey became pronounced. Marine transports of MAG-35 at Cherry Point were expeditiously utilized to fly reinforcements to our Marine Barracks at that locality to help protect mutual interests plus Navy and Marine dependents stationed there.

While the problem was being discussed at the highest level in the fall of 1956, the increasing need for tactical and logistical support using air transport and cargo type aircraft was again re-emphasized. The fleet commander in the Mediterranean Sea needed all of his organic air transport support. He also asked for assistance from the Marines to help take care of the backlog of high pri-

ority cargo that was created during that emergency. In accordance with his wishes a detachment of MAG-35 was sent to Port Lyautey where they have been operating periodically since that time.


These vital support missions during peacetime have been repeated several times. The distances in the Pacific area point to the additional importance of swift carrier service. This service was carried out especially well during a recent series of extended maneuvers by the 1st MAW during the spring of 1958 while the Indonesian tension was running high. Units of the Wing were located at some ten different points in the vital island chain defense from Japan to Okinawa to the Philippine Islands. The R4Qs of the Wing's Transport Squadron (VMR-253) supplemented by a detachment of R5Ds from El Toro were supporting these widespread units night and day. Several months of maneuvers and sudden readiness drills were of definite value in maintaining the peace.

The operations of Marine air transport support is of great importance to the Navy and Marine ground and sea forces during both peace and war. They play an essential role in every operation or maneuver.

Marine combat transport aviation feels it has a place in the sun and wants to see its part in the support of the doctrines and ideas developed. It is looking forward to the attainment of a new type transport aircraft similar to the C-130 Lockheed "Hercules" which will have versatility not presently realized.

This new type aircraft is capable of not only carrying 20 tons of cargo or 92 fully equipped troops into combat, but can eject 29,000 pounds of supplies by parachute to those in need. In addition it is pressurized and can be utilized as a refueler for our modern type jets, and for evacuation purposes.

Progress brings about new ideas and new types of aircraft. Tactical commanders work out new maneuvers. Likewise, the Marine Corps both in the field and at its Landing Force Development Center at Quantico, is developing ideas to help make our Corps more useful and the world a safer place to live a peaceful life.



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> Beefing up Marine Aviation strengthens two of the Corps' specialties: vertical envelopment and amphibious assault. In the Crusader-equipped Marine fighter pilot, the Marine rifleman has a powerful partner. In both, the U.S. owns one of the world's

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Deputy CG



LtGen V. E. Megee

MajGen F. M. McAlister



D/C of S

Col E. W. Johnston



Col DeV Schatz

C of

G-3

Gener



G-1

Col D. C. Pollock



G-2

Col W. F. Prickett



Col D. J. oberts



Force Inspector

Col H. D. Adams



Force Engineer

Col W. W. Lewis



Force Comm-Elect Officer

LtCol J. W. Bowman



Force Medical Officer Capt

G. Donabedian, USN



CG 1st Mar Div

MajGen E. W. Snedeker



CG 1st Mar Brig

BGen A. R. Kier



CG Force Troops

BGen A. L. Bowser




ADC 1st Mar Div

BGen T. F. Riley

As of 31 March 1959

Copies available on request



FLEET MARINE

COMMANDING GENERAL DEPUTY COMMANDER CHIEF OF STAFF

110 C D-	Col D. L. Cool	MADE 99	M-1 M W ** "
H&S BR	LtCol R. H. Jeschke	VMF 884	Maj M. K. Hollenbeck LtCol J. B. Winters
let Radio Co	Capt W. J. Carman	VMF-951	LtCol A. L. Clark
1st Radio Co	oup III J	VMF-323	LtCol D. L. Lengel
FIRST MARI	INE BRIGADE	VMCI-1	LtCol A. E. James
Commanding General	BGen A. R. Kier	,	2001 II 2. Junes
Chief of Staff	Col G. A. Roll	MAG(HR)-36	Col J. F. Dobbin
		H&MS-36	LtCol S. A. Smith
4TH MARINES	Col J. H. Masters	MABS-36	Maj C. A. House
1st Battalion	LtCol R. H. Currin	HMR-361	LtCol R. M. Hunt
2d Battalion	LtCol J. S. Hudson	HMR-362	LtCol E. P. Dunn
3d Battalion	LtCol A. M. Zimmer Capt N. C. Tullis	HMR-363	LtCol H. R. Barr
Headquarters Co	Capt J. R. Fox	HMR-462	LtCol A. W. McCully
Co B (Reinf), 3d A1 Bn	Bn Capt D. A. Colby	HMR-463	LtCol K. L. Moos
		VMO-6	LtCol H. F. Brown
MAG-13	Col P. J. Fontana	MMSC 97	CIA D CIA
H&MS-13	Maj R. C. Woten	MWSG-37	Col A. B. Galatian, Jr.
MABS-13	Maj R. J. Morrison	MADS 97	Maj L. D. Hastings
VMF-232	LtCol L. H. Steman	MADS-37	LtCol G. H. Linnemeir LtCol F. L. Thomas, Jr.
	LtCol J. F. Bolt	VMD 859	LtCol P. W. Kelly
VMA-212	LtCol C. M. Moore	VMR-352	Licoi P. W. Kelly
MACS-2	Maj R. J. Butters	FIRST MADINE A	IDODAET WING
HMR (L)-161	Maj W. R. Young	FIRST MARINE A	
SERVICE BATTALION	LtCol E. S. Dzura	Commanding General	MajGen C. H. Hayes
	Capt W. G. Bates	Assistant Wing Commander	BGen R. C. Mangrum
Co C, 3d MT Bn	Capt J. A. Corbet	Chief of Staff	
1st Landing Support Co	Maj F. P. Coppins	MWHG	
Co A, 1st AmTrac Bn	Capt D. G. Mehargue	H&HS	Maj J. L. Reed
Co B, 3d Med Bn	Lt M. A. Connors (USN)	MASS-2	Maj F. N. Pippin
lst Light Support Co	Capt J. W. Medis	Sub-Unit 1, MASS-2	lstLt F. T. Sullivan
Det, 3d Dental Co	Lt R. T. Blackwell (USN)		LtCol R. E. Smith
Headquarters Co	Capt R. L. Burke	11th Force Dental Co (Avn	Capt W. Naish (USN)
Service Co	Maj J. H. Thomas RINES LtCol B. H. Elliott	MAG-11	Cal I P Massa
3D BATTALION, 12TH MA	RINES LtCol B. H. Elliott		Maj R. M. Moore
HEADQUARTERS COMPAN	NY Maj D. H. Blanchard	H&MS-11	LtCol A. D. Simpson
AIDCDAFT FIFET MA	RINE FORCE, PACIFIC	VMF(AW)-115	LtCol H. A. Langstaff
		VMF(AW)-314	LtCol D. H. Johnson
	MajGen S. S. Jack	VMF-451	Maj W. R. Nowadnick
	Col M. A. Severson		LtCol J. N. Cupp
	LtCol S. B. O'Neill, Jr.	H&MS-11	Maj J. E. McVey
VMT-2	LtCol F. J. Gilhuly	MATCU-66	Maj D. R. Judge
THIRD MARINE	AIRCRAFT WING		
		MAG-12	
Commanding General	Maj Gen T. G. Ennis	H&MS-12	Maj H. P. Mosca, Jr.
	Col R. A. Black	MABS-12	Maj F. Mick
	Col N. T. Post, Jr.		LtCol H. A. Eisele
	Maj J. Cosley LtCol J. L. Mahon		LtCol E. P. Carey
MASS-3	LtCol M. C. Cregory	VMCJ-3	LtCol R. R. Read
MACS 9	LtCol M. C. Gregory LtCol J. W. Poindexter	2446/7772 /7 144	61
	(n) Capt E. A. Goldsmith (USN)	MAG(HR) (L)-16	
		H&MS-16	LtCol W. O. Reid
MAG-15	Col R. M. Huezenga		Maj F. G. Parks
H&MS-15	LtCol P. A. Lemarie, Jr.	HMK-201	LtCol E. K. Griswold
	LtCol L. H. Stewart	MMK (L)-103	LtCol R. L. Cochran LtCol J. Cosgriff
	LtCol T. M. Saxon	VMO-2	LtCol J. Cosgriii
VMA-223	LtCol D. E. Severance	MWSC 17	Cal I I Nosfus
VMA-311	LtCol D. D. Rickabaugh	MWSG-17	Maj R. W. Baker
VMF-513	LtCol L. D. Grow		LtCol J. H. Blumenstein
VMF(AW)-542	LtCol H. N. Mehaffey		Maj C. H. McGee
MAG-88	Col W. E. Clasen	VMR-253	LtCol H. W. Horst
	LtCol W. G. Voss		Maj J. Urell
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FORCE PACIFIC

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
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FIRST MARINE DIV	VISION (REINF)	12th Marines	
Commanding General	MajGen E. W. Snedeker	Headquarters Btry	Capt H. E. Wold
Assistant Division Commander	BGen T. F. Riley	1st Battalion	Maj R. Zuegne
Chief of Staff	Col R. B. Wilde	2d Battalion	LtCol J. C. McClelland
Headquarters Battalion (Reinf)	LtCol L. Treleaven	4th Battalion	LtCol K. P. Dunkl
1st Force Recon Co	Capt H. Redfield	3d Svc Bn	LtCol P. B. McNico
lst Marines		3d AT Bn	LtCol R. K. McClelland
lst Marines	Cont V D Hyslon	3d Pioneer Bn	
Headquarters Co	Capt K. D. Hyslop	3d Recon Bn	LtCol T. F. Spike
1st Battalion	LtCol W. C. Chip	3d MT Bn	Maj M. E. Mangun
2d Battalion	LtCol F. I. Fenton	3d Med Bn Cdr S	
	LtCol R. R. Breen	Division Schools	Col I. W. Stevens I
5th Marines	Col T. A. Smoak		
Headquarters Co	Capt H. L. Dawe	FORCE TROOPS ATTACHED	D TO 3d MARDIV (REINI
1st Battalion	LtCol R. C. Rosaker		
2d Battalion	LtCol B. F. Sohn	9th MT Bn	LtCol J. R. Ston
3d Battalion	LtCol S. S. Hughes	1st 8" How Btry 2d Plat 1st Hvy Arty Rkt Btry	Maj B. G. Cas
7th Marines		2d Plat 1st Hvy Arty Rkt Btry	Capt W. E. Anderson
in Marines	Capt W. C. Williams	3d 155mm HowBtry	Maj C. R. Munn, Jr
Headquarters Colst Battalion	LtCol C F Martin	3d Tank Bn	
1st Battalion	I tCol A I Adams	lst Bridge Plat, 1st Bridge Co	lstLt W. H. Long
2d Battalion	Licol A. L. Adams	Co C, 7th Engineers	Capt R. S. Silverthorn
3d Battalion		lst AmTracBn	LtCol A. J. Barret
11th Marines	Col R. C. Hiatt	3d Force Svc Regt	Col R. D. Webe
Headquarters Btry	Capt J. R. Guest, Jr.	Det 5th AOP	Capt H. G. Edebohl
1st Battalion	LtCol R. L. Sullivan	1st 4.5" Rkt Btry	Capt H. C. Chase
2d Battalion	LtCol J. E. Fogg	3d Dental Co	Capt L. N. Young (USN
3d Battalion	LtCol B. E. Keith		
4th Battalion	LtCol H. C. Baker	FORCE T	ROOPS
st Svc Battalion	Col R. M. Wismer	Commanding General	BGen A. L. Bowse
lst Dental Co	Capt K. V. Berglund (USN)	Chief of Staff	Col B. T. Hemphil
st AT Bn	LtCol H. K. Throneson	Commander, Hq, 1st Field Arty	Grp Col C. Burton
st Pioneer Bn	LtCol J. J. Butler IV	Ha Btry, 1st Field Arty Gri	Capt H. F. Lundy
st MT Bn	LtCol R. N. Davis	Commander, Hq AAA Grp	Col F. W. Benson
st Recon Bn	LtCol H. J. Woessner	Ha Btry, AAA Grp	Capt W. C. Simanika
st Med Bn (Reinf)	Cdr B. Willard (USN)	Headquarters Co, Force Troops	Mai E. L. Star
1st Separate Surg Co	CWO E. W. Gates (USN)	lst 155mm Gun Btry	Mai R. D. Cai
lst Hosp Co	CWO E. W. Gates (USN)	2d 155mm Gun Btry	Capt I. I. Marror
st Tank Bn	LtCol J. R. Munday	2d 155mm Gun Btry 3d 155mm Gun Btry	Mai W. W. Hixsor
3d AmTrac Bn (Reinf)	LtCol W. T. Shafer	1st 155mm How Btry	Mai R. F. Dawson
3d ArmdAm Co	Maj F. X. Hoff	1st Hvy Arty Rkt Btry	Mai I. R. Gallman, Ir
lst ArmdAmTrk Co	Capt M. A. Willis	3d 8" How Btry	Mai C. H. Mas
th Comm Bn	LtCol R. J. Augeri	3d 8" How Btry	Mai W D Rollinger
th Engr Bn (Reinf)	LtCol M. Mosteller	lst AAA(AW)Bn	Mai I C Lawis In
lst Bridge Co	Capt D. D. Crew. Ir.	2d AAA(AW)Bn	I Col C A Line
lst EOD Co		Det, 1st Force Svc Regt	I Col F W Power
th MT Bn	LtCol N C Gregory	Co. D. 7th From Bo	Little A. J. Doobe J.
		Co D, 7th Engr Bn	Capt W W Lippold (USN
THIRD MARINE DIV		Jii Dentai Go	Capt W. W. Lippoid (CSIV)
Commanding General	MajGen D. M. Shoup	SECURITY	FORCES
Assistant Division Commander	BGen L. C. Hudson		
Chief of Staff	Col R. M. Tompkins	MB, USNB, Pearl Harbor	Col W. M. Nelsor
Headquarters Battalion	Col J. R. Lirette	MB, NAD, Oahu	Col E. W. Ritzat
d Marines	Col I. P. Ferrill, Ir.	MB, USNAS, Barber's Point, O.	ahu LtCol A. J. Friston
Headquarters Co	Capt D. L. Diamond	MB, USNB, Guam	Col A. A. Vandegrift, Jr
lst Battalion	LtCol F R Rerrar	MB, USNS, Sangley Point	LtCol H. P. Williamson
2d Battalion	ItCol I D Trompeter	MB, USNB, Subic Bay	
3d Battalion	I tCol M H Silvantham	MB, USFA, Yokosuka	Col W. K. Davenport. Ir
		MB, USFA, Sasebo	Mai I. Glent
th Marines		MB, USFA, Sasebo	LtCol S. K. Pawlosk
Headquarters Co	Maj. C. R. Casey	,	
1st Battalion	LtCol W. C. Esterline	CAMP SMEDLE	V D. BUTLER
		CITIVIL OWILLIES	and the same
2d Battalion	LtCol R. E. Sullivan	Headquarters and Service Co	

BOTTLENECK IN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

By Capt D. C. MacMichael



THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT CLOSE air support is the most versatile and effective means of delivering fire support to the ground commander. The availability of close air support may well be considered the key factor in the success of the Marine divisionwing team. Our WWII-developed system proved itself completely during the early phases of the Korean conflict as attested by the admiring and envious comments made by Army officers who were not as well-served.

The secret of success in Marine close air support has always been the determination of both air and ground commanders to make support aircraft available to the infantryman as rapidly and as often as possible. The rationale of this determination is that the support aircraft is most effective when used in close support, that is, air support so close to the front line that it requires integration with the fire and movement of the ground troops.

It is this philosophy that has made it possible for support aircraft to be considered as a normal supporting arm to be used when available at the commander's discretion, and not as some special and precious commodity whose use is approved only at the highest echelons. This may be contrasted with the beliefs attributed to the Air Force which holds that close support of ground troops is not the most effective use for attack aircraft. and that other missions, particularly interdiction, get priority. This feeling naturally tends to deprive the ground commander of any assurance that air will be normally available to him.

The conflict between the two philosophies is one with which most Marines are familiar. It is not the intention of this article to establish the superiority of one system over the other. What it does intend to do is to discuss the present Marine Corps system for requesting air support with the objective of pointing out ways in which our methods should be modified in accordance with nuclear age tactics so that the embattled Marine infantryman can continue to look to the sky with confidence and hope.

With this goal stated it would not be amiss to review briefly the Marine close air support request system as presently constituted. Every Marine infantry battalion has one Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). In addition there are TACPs at regiment and division for a total of 13 in the division.

When a battalion commander, after consulting with his air liaison officer, decides to request close air support, his TACP transmits the request over the Tactical Air Request (TAR) net. TACPs at regiment and division monitor the net, and may interpose objections or indicate consent by remaining silent.

The request is received at the Direct Air Support Center (DASC), a wing agency located at the division CP, which exercises net control.

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In the DASC the Senior Air Director is in contact with orbiting support aircraft through the Tactical Air Traffic Control (TATC) net. After first checking with the Air Intelligence officer in the DASC to make sure that the strike is not going to endanger friendly forces, he causes a flight armed with the proper ordnance to check into the Tactical Air Direction (TAD) net. The pilot is briefed on his mission, and directed to report to the Forward Air Controller (FAC) of the requesting TACP who is also on the TAD net.

Control of the strike may be exercised by the FAC, a Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TACA), or by the flight leader himself. When the mission is completed the pilot checks back to the DASC on the TAD net, and gives a damage assessment. He then returns to orbit if he still has ordnance and time on station remaining. Otherwise he checks out and returns to base.

The system is simple, and for success depends only on maintenance of local air superiority, good weather, and good communications among aircraft, DASC and TACP. It works best, of course, with the planes for which it was designed, planes with great endurance and load capacity such as the F4U and the AD. It also has the great advantage of keeping control of supporting air centralized at the division, and being flexible enough to pass control to lower echelons when necessary.

However, as was mentioned earlier, this system was developed during WW II, and could stand a little constructive criticism in the light of the anticipated tactical situations now confronting us.



Capt MacMichael enlisted in the Marine Corps in July 1946 and served as a radio operator with various FMF units. After receiving his discharge he attended Hampden-Sydney College, graduating in 1952 and returning to the Marine Corps via the PLC program. Subsequent service included duty with the 3d Marines; 7th Marines (Korea); 2d Amph Recon Co; 2d MAW; and command of MD, USS Galveston. Capt MacMichael is now stationed at MCS, Quantico.

The more significant changes in the situation as they apply to close air support are these. First, the division area of responsibility has been increased enormously. LFB-17 calls for frontages of 50 miles or more and depths of up to 100 miles. Furthermore, the units of the division will be tied in physically no longer, but will be separated by great distances.

The characteristics of attack aircraft have changed markedly also. Jet attack planes such as the A4D are much inferior to the AD, for instance, in such characteristics as load carrying ability and endurance on station. All jet aircraft consume much more fuel at low altitudes where the attack plane operates, thus further reducing time on station.

With these changes in mind it is evident that our present system for providing close air support—which relies on the communications of closely tied in units in a relatively restricted area, and is designed for aircraft of a far different sort than today's—does require some revision.

Centralized control by a DASC, however desirable, will have to be abandoned due to the communications difficulty. Once our battalions become as farflung and widely separated as they will be under the nuclear concept, it is unlikely that the lowpowered team pack or jeep mounted radios available to the TACP will always be capable of reaching a centrally located DASC. As a matter of fact, this has been in the past and is now the greatest flaw in the system. LFM-25 says bluntly, "Communications deficiencies oftentimes come to be the most frequent single cause for delay in execution of direct air support operations."

Most often it is the TAR net which is deficient. In addition to the limitations placed on it by equipment, the mere fact that there are 14 stations (counting net control) on it makes this net a difficult one.

Turning to the aircraft themselves, their comparatively low endurance has been discussed. It appears wasteful to consume much of their brief on station time in communications checks with the DASC.

Very likely it will be found necessary to place a certain number of close support aircraft in direct support of each battalion in order to guarantee air support to the commander when he needs it. This could be done in either of two ways.

The first method would have aircraft report directly to the battalion commander in accordance with air schedules, for such support as he might require. Relieving one another on station, two or more aircraft would be overhead at all times. Certainly this system would require a great many planes, and would be very expensive. However, it would ensure availability of air to the battalion commander.

Another method would be to keep a TACA overhead in lieu of the attack aircraft. This plane could be an OE or similar type, or perhaps even a helicopter instead of a high performance type. The attack planes themselves would remain on strip alert until called by the TACA in response to a request generated from the ground. This is a far more economical system, and would be used after airstrips in the objective area had been captured and readied for use.

Absence of a central controlling agency should not bring about as many difficulties as one might think. Central control has been necessary for two reasons. First, aircraft safety. Only two simultaneous strikes can be run per mile of troop front. When, as in WWII, units were closely tied in, the central agency was needed to prevent planes from endangering one another. Second,

when ground units are "cheek to jowl" it is necessary to keep a close watch on air requests to make sure that one unit does not direct a strike into another's area of responsibility. With battalions separated by many miles this is no longer a likely possibility.

Moreover, elimination of centralized control of close air support as represented by the DASC would show some very solid advantages in addition to the obvious one of increasing the availability of air support to battalion commanders. These are:

 More positive communication between ground and air will result from the elimination of the HF TAR net and exclusive use of UHF line of sight radio between planes and ground.

2) Location and identification of targets, a time consuming procedure, will be made easier if pilots are assigned to a certain area within the zone of action, and can thus familiarize themselves with it. Even planes called from strip alert will find it easier to locate targets marked from the air by a TACA familiar with the area and local front lines. This is especially important when one considers the high speed of the jets and the resultant difficulty in air-ground orientation.

3) Aircraft can be requested and employed simultaneously all over the division area. The DASC can process only one request at a time.

4) Close air support will be needed in greater haste than ever, in order to attack enemy troops capable of massing or dispersing rapidly in tracked vehicles and helicopters.

5) It would allow the abandonment of the DASC with its heavy, bulky gear, and its dangerous concentration of radio transmitters at the division CP. This would improve security and lessen the logistic burden at the same time.

It has been stated over and over that battalion commanders engaged in nuclear war, whether all out or limited, must be prepared to act independently of division control. This they cannot do unless they have adequate control of supporting arms.

One of the ways this can be done is by eliminating the bottleneck in our present system of requesting close air support.

MARINE

Lieut. Col. Commandant.

NAME.	Original entre into bie service	Date of present
Archibald Henderson,	4 June, 1806	17 Oct. 1820

Captains,

NAME	Original outry	Lineal Rank.
R. Smith, Brevet Lt. Col. R. D. Wainwright, do. W. Anderson, do. S Miller, do. John M. Gamble, do.	9 May, 1800	100-000-000-000-000-000-000-000-000-000
Samuel E. Watson, William H Freeman, Jos L. Kuhn, Pay Mast. Charles R. Broom.	7 Aug. 1812 27 July, 1813	28 Mar. 1820 17 July, 1821 28 June, 1823 7 Mar. 1824

First Lieutenants,

Capains by brevet.	Original	entry	1	ineal 1	Pank.
Levi Twiggs,	IU NOV.	1813	18	June,	1314
John Harris	13 April,	1814		do.	
Thomas A Linton,	28 Feb.	1815	18	April,	1817
Richard T. Anchmuty,	do.	50000		do.	
James Edelin,	1 Mar.	1815	200	do.	
P. G. Howle, adj & insp.	do do	4		do.	4
E. J. Weed, Qr. Master,	16 Jan.	1817	3	Mar.	1819
Joseph C. Hall,	10 June,	1817		do.	
William W. Dulany,	do.	250	19	June,	1819
Thomas S. English,	do.	1000	11	Aug.	1815
Thomas R. Barton,	do,	1000	17	Oct.	1820
Canros W Walker.	do.	A-123	3	Mar.	1821

CORPS.

State	State	State of	Duty or Station.
where	fr. which	which a	
here,	appoint d	citizen.	
	THE RESERVE OF THE PARTY OF THE	200-20000000000000000000000000000000000	Head Quarters

in number, 9.

Brevei rank	Where burn.	Ap-	Citizen	Duty or Station.
3 Mar. 1825 3 Mar. 1827 24 My.1828 3 Mar. 1827 3 Mar. 1827	S Car Penn Mass	S Car' Penn Mass	Md S Car Penn Mass N H	Under arrest Charlestown, Mass Gosport, Va. Philadelphia New York
NEW YORK	Va Conn Md	Ken Conn Md	Va Conn Md Del	Portsmouth, N H Navy Yard, Wash'ton Navy Department Navy Yard, Wash'ton


in number, 24.

Brevet rank S Mar, 1823 do. 18 Ap. 1827 do. do. do.	Geo Fenn	Gen Penn R I Md Va	Geo Penn R 1 Md Va	Philadelphia Delaware 74 Gosport, Va Charlestown; Mass Prigate Brandywini Head quarters
	Penn	Penn	Penn	Head quarters
	Md	Md	Md	Prigate Java
	Va	Va	Va	Charlestown, Mass
	Mass	Mass	V II	Portsmouth, N H
	Penn	Penn	Penni	Frigate Guerriere
	D C	D C	D C	Frigate Hudson

The year 1829 found Marines aboard Navy ships in all corners of the world. The tasks of the Naval squadrons during 1829 were to patrol potential trouble spots for the protection of American merchantmen and "show the flag" in various spots of the world. This lineal list, submitted for publication by MajGen D. C. McDougal, USMC (Ret), depicts the officer strength and location of detachments from which has grown the force-in-readiness of 1959—a thousand times more powerful, but with a similar mission.

MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON

Delaware	Java	Lexington	Fairfield
	PACIFIC	SQUADRON	
Brandywine	G	uerriere	St. Louis
	WEST IND	IA SQUADRON	
Erie	N	Natchez	Falmouth
	BRAZIL	SQUADRON	
Hudson	V	andalia	Boston
DETACHED	VESSEL		. Vincennes
RECEIVING S	HIP NEW YORK		Fulton



49

MARINE CORPS.

NAME.	Original entry into the service.	Brevet Rank.	
Charles Grymes, - Ward Marston, - Charles C. Tupper,	do.	20 July, 1821 30 Oct. 1821 21 Jan. 1822	
A. A. Nicholson, James M'Cawley, Benjamin Macomber, A. N Brevoorte,	28 Mar. 1820 do. do. do.	27 May, 1822 6 Oct. 1822 2 April, 1823 22 Sept. 1823	
Andrew Ross, William A. Bloodgood, Richard Douglas,	S Mar 1821 do. 7 May, 1822	1 Oct. 1824 1 Dec. 1824 26 April, 1825	
fob G. Williams, C. P. Spering, 1st Likutavasta—24.	do.	27 Dec. 1825 19 Feb. 1828	

Second Lieutenants,

Alvin Edson.	7 May,	1822
Horatio N. Crabb	Ditto	No. 12 Acres
Henry B. Tyler, .	3 March	1823
Joseph L. C. Hardy, .	Ditto	
George F. Lindsay.	1 April, .	1823
Landon N. Carter	26 May, .	18.4
John G. Reynolds, .	Ditto	
Henry W. Fowler	Ditto	
Francis C. Hall,	5 July,	1825
Constantine Smith.	27 August,	1825
Francis S. Neville	22 May,	1826
Thomas L. C. Watkins,	Ditto	
Thomas Lee,	4 November.	1826
F. N. Armistead,	13 November,	1826
Theo. Bainbridge, 2d LIEUTEVANTS-15.	24 May	1828

Navy Agents,

James K. Paulding.	8 January,	1824
George Harrison, .	21 November,	1799
James Riddle,	14 July, • •	1812
James Beatty,	7 May.	1810

REGISTER OF THE NAVY.

State	State	State of	Duty or Station.
where	fr. which	which	
born,	appoint'd	acidiz en	
Virginia	Virginia	Virginia	Gosport, Va Delaware 74 Sloop Vincennes Steam Frigate Fulton Sloop Falmouth New York Sloop Natchez Sloop Lexington Sloop Vandalia Philadelphia Gosport, Va
Mass	Mass	Mass	
N York	N York	N York	
S Car	9 Car	B Car	
Penn	Penn	Penn	
R Island	H Island	N York	
N York	N York	N York	
N York	Louis'ns	N York	
N York	N York	N York	
Penn	N Jer	N York	
Mass	N York	Penn	
Penn	Penn	Penn	

in number, 15.

Vermont	Vermont		New York
Penn	Penn.	Penn	Philadelphia
Virginia	Virginia	Virginia	Navy Yard, Washington
N York	S Car	S Car	Sloop Boston
Virginia	Mississip	Mississip	Pensacola
Virginia		Virginia	Sloop St. Louis
N Jer	N York	N York	Sloop Pairfield
N York	Louis'ns	Louis'na	New York
Maryl'd	Maryl'd	Maryl'd	Charlestown, Mass
Ireland	N York	N York	New York
Penn	Ohio	Ohio	Frigate Hudson
MaryPd	Dist Col	Dist Col	Charlestown
Maryl'd		Maryl'd	
Virginia		.Virginia	
N Jer	N Vork	N Vork	Prigate Guerriere

in number, 15.

N York Penn Delaw're Maryl'd N York Penn Delaw're Maryl'd Maryl'd Maryl'd	Philadelphia New Castle, Delaware
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THE **INCREDIBLE** CACTUS AIR FORCE

By 2dLt Thomas V. Kirkland


P ONE OF THE MOST BEWILDERING and hybrid units in WWII was composed of a group of pilots who flew from the jungle covered island of Guadalcanal. Day after day, these men fought against the Japanese with determined courage even though their planes were virtually obsolete and they lacked spare parts. The planes were kept in the air by a dash of American ingenuity and an economy of means that defies description.

This group of Army, Navy and Marine elements performed individually and as a team, although they never officially operated as an administrative unit. The code name for the Guadalcanal campaign was CACTUS and the small group of pilots soon began calling themselves the

Cactus Air Force.

When the 1st MarDiv landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, there was light opposition from the Japanese. MajGen A. A. Vandegrift quickly captured the Japanese airstrip, set up a perimeter defense around it, and named it Henderson Field in honor of Maj Lofton R. Henderson, Marine air hero of Midway days. The 6th CB Bn immediately began improving the runway surface and lengthening it to 3,800 feet. On 12 August, a PBY-5A landed on the strip to evacuate two wound-





First US aircraft to land on Guadalcanal — PBY-5A

ed Marines. Thus the first US airplane touched down on Henderson Field, an airstrip that was to be the cause of much fighting.

Within a few days of the 1st Mar Div landing, the situation began to take on desperate proportions. The Navy ships had pulled out due to the threat of superior Japanese forces in the area, leaving the Marines in a precarious logistical situation. In preparation for a largescale attack against the perimeter, the enemy conducted daily air raids and naval shellings against Henderson as well as disembarking troops at Taivu Point. It became immediately apparent that air power was needed if Guadalcanal was to be successfully defended from the onrushing Japanese.

The only airman on the island at that time was the air liaison officer on MajGen Vandegrift's staff. There were no ground crews to support fighter aircraft even if the aircraft had been there. VAdm J. S. McCain, however, dispatched a Marine Major to Guadalcanal to see about commissioning the airstrip. With 118 men of CUB-1, the Major and a Navy Ensign arrived at Guadalcanal to prepare for the arrival of the desperately needed aircraft.

On the afternoon of 20 August, 19 Grumman F4Fs touched down on Henderson to the cheering of the ground Marines. Their arrival coincided with the first battle fought by the 1st MarDiv. Within twelve hours, the planes were performing their first mission in supporting the ground forces—patrolling and strafing the beaches east of the airfield and cutting off the retreat of the Japanese forces which the Marines

had repelled at the Battle of the Tenaru River. (This battle was, in fact, fought at Alligator Creek. Poor maps and Intelligence account for the misnomer.)

On 22 August, five Army P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron flew up from New Caledonia, and five days later nine more of the P-400s arrived. These planes were an export version of the Bell Aircobra P-39, and they had a high-pressure oxygen system which could not be utilized with the meager facilities at Guadalcanal. Also, the engines had inadequate superchargers so the P-400s were unable to attain the necessary altitude to engage enemy aircraft which normally flew around 25,000 to 30,000 feet.

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was developing quickly and on 24 August, a Marine flight intercepted a group of 15 bombers and 12 fighters. The enemy never reached Guadalcanal. During the aerial battle, the Japanese lost 16 aircraft before they turned back towards their base. For the 16 downed enemy, however, 3 Marine pilots did not return; another was shot down over Tulagi, but later rejoined his group.

It was also on this day that Navy aircraft began coming into Henderson Field. The *Enterprise* had received considerable damage during the day's battle and one of her SBD flights was low on fuel and daylight, so they landed at Henderson Field, where they remained until 27 September, giving invaluable aid to the small air arm on the island.

The theory that the Zero was invincible was held by many pilots at the start of the war; however, the men of CACTUS quickly disproved

this notion when at the end of 10 days they had downed 56 Zeros.

The very next day after their first aerial battle, a flight of 16 twin-engined bombers was intercepted and a brilliant display of individual skill accounted for most of the 13 knocked out.

On 28 August, the Japanese tried to land 3,500 more troops on the island, but 2 scouting SBDs found the 4 transports. Eleven SBDs rushed up and attacked the unloading ships, damaging three of them and sending the fourth one back to its base. Two days later, 14 enemy bombers were halted. The P-400s managed to bring down 4 enemy planes, but they in turn lost 4 aircraft from which two of the pilots walked back to Henderson. Beside the 4 that were shot down, 6 were heavily damaged so that by 30 August there were only 4 P-400s in operating condition.

Because of the P-400's inability to operate at higher altitudes, it was unsuited for interceptor work; therefore, they were eventually assigned to reconnaissance missions around the islands. Their feeling of the situation was expressed by the squadron historian who wrote,

"We can't maneuver and dogfight the Zero . . . our enlisted men are risking their lives . . . trying to get the planes patched up—for what? Hell, we can't fight. When the Japs come, we're told to 'go on reconnaissance.' . . ."

However they felt at the time, their reconnaissance work was greatly appreciated by the ground troops. One of the biggest problems the ground forces had on Guadalcanal was the paucity of reliable maps and a lack of intelligence on enemy positions and movements, but through aerial recon, the P-400 pilots supplied much of this valuable information to the ground forces. In addition, armed with a 20mm cannon, two .50 caliber, four .30 caliber machine guns, and a 500 pound bomb, they strafed and bombed enemy troops and landing barges.

Meanwhile, the ground crews worked around the clock to keep the planes aloft. Henderson's black dust fouled engines, and mud often made take-offs and landings a hair-raising occurrence. Bombs had to be racked by hand as there were no bomb hoists. All refueling was done by hand from 55 gallon drums. The radio situation was abominable. Guadalcanal's radio could barely be heard from 20 miles away, although aircraft radios could often reach the base from as far out as 100 miles. To make matters even more complicated, the P-400s operated on a different frequency from the Navy and Marine planes, but by taking a radio out of a damaged P-400, a doublemike unit was set up so that com**Lt Kirkland** entered the Marine Corps in the 21st OCC and graduated from Basic School in August of 1958. He is a graduate of the University of North Carolina with a degree in Latin American Affairs, and is now serving with the 1st Marine Air Wing in Japan.

munications to all aircraft was made possible.

The Wildcat pilots also operated under difficulties. The F4F was sturdy and had good firepower, but it was no match for the highly maneuverable Zero. The Zero could out-turn, out-climb, and out-run the Grumman. About the only way an F4F could escape the clutches of a Zero was to dive straight down. Because of its sturdiness, the Grumman could out-dive the Zero without shearing the wings. Due to the difference in performance between the Zero and the Grumman, the two-plane section quickly evolved, in which two planes mutually supported each other by keeping enemy aircraft from making attacks from the rear.

In a personal interview with this writer, Mr. Saburo Sakai, Japan's

greatest living air ace and co-author of the book, "Samurai," stated that, in his opinion, the two-plane section at Guadalcanal was a great contributing factor towards the defeat of the more combat-experienced Japanese pilots at that time. He further stated that he encountered very determined opposition over Guadalcanal and the plunging Wildcats shredded Zero formations over and over again.

Throughout the entire month of August, Japanese air raids continued with daily sorties and the Marine, Navy and Army pilots conducted themselves with great bravery and ability. The entire fight was one of teamwork, but instances of individual heroism were not uncommon.

Regardless of Cactus' efforts, the Tokyo express had managed to put troops ashore in preparation for another large offensive move. VAdm McCain asked Gen MacArthur to send his 18 P-38s to Guadalcanal, but MacArthur was busy with a threatening invasion of Port Moresby and could not spare them.

On 1 September, BGen Roy Geiger moved his headquarters to the island. A radar unit was installed, but due to its poor location and habitual breakdown, it was virtually useless. On 5 September, an R4D landed on Henderson with a morale-building payload of 3,000 pounds of candy and cigarettes for the troops. It took off with wounded and thus the 38 transports of MAG 25 began their enormous job of resupply and evacuation. In a three month period, the R4Ds evacuated 2,879 casualties from the island.

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
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The odds were slowly beginning to favor Cactus and it is estimated that combat losses at the time were five Japanese planes lost to their one. To add to the impending enemy threat, however, rains began to fall on the island and flying conditions were far from ideal. The afternoon of 8 September, for example, 16 F4Fs took off on an alert in the rain and fog. Upon landing late that afternoon, one plane crashed



Henderson Field, Guadalcanal - the "Patch of Destiny"



In three days - 23 SBDs lost

into a bulldozer and four more careened off the muddy runway; only by signaling them in carrier-fashion with flashlights did the rest manage to squeeze in before the weather closed altogether.

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As the renewed Japanese attack drew to an apex, Cacrus took on a bewildering aspect at full speed. Planes arrived from Espiritu Santo to help augment the ground forces. Navy flights from the carriers Hornet, Wasp and Saratoga came and went with such informality that to this day no one knows exactly what planes were on Henderson at what specific time. By 22 September, it was known that 1,014 aviation personnel were on the island. Of this, 33 were Army, 64 Navy and the rest Marines. It was an administrative horror. As one officer said of the affair, "We never knew what squadron we were in; we were never carried as an administrative unit."

On 11 October, a large raid announced the beginning of the new enemy offensive. That night, the Navy ships closed with the enemy in a battle that came to be known as the Battle of Cape Esperance.

On 13 October, using available cloud cover, the Japanese struck Henderson with a devastating air raid, as well as shelling from 150-mm's landed ashore the night before. During the night, the enemy landing force loomed over the horizon and shell after shell tore into the airstrip. Many of the airplanes were totally damaged and ground crews worked feverishly to commission the less severely damaged aircraft. Between intermittent shelling and air raids, 41 Americans lost their lives and for a while it appeared as

if the enemy was going to successfully overrun the valuable airstrip.


By morning, the SBDs were all but ruined. Our air opposition was practically at a standstill due to the heavy damage suffered from the shelling and, adding to the situation, Japanese troops were swarming ashore at Tassafaronga, only 10 miles away. Only 3 SBDs were able to fly. One fell into a bomb crater while taxiing to the runway; another was wrecked as it hit a crater on takeoff, but its pilot tried again with the last bomber and managed to find his way down the damaged runway and into the air. Four F4Fs followed and strafed troops on the shore, but this was comparatively useless. Later that day, due to the ingenuity and determination of the ground crews, more aircraft were ready to fly.

Twelve SBDs, P-400s and P-39s took to the air with bombs and joined in the attack with results that left much of the enemy shipping crippled. One Marine Major exemplified the desperation on Guadalcanal that day when he took off in his sluggish PBY-5A with two torpedoes slung under the wings. He maneuvered the clumsy ship around and dropped his torpedoes toward the Japanese ships. Zeros began attacking him as he made his way back towards Henderson. One Zero determinedly stayed on the PBY's tail as the Major banked into the final approach to land. Entering the landing pattern at the same time was another American pilot who swung in behind the Zero and shot it down.

At the end of three days, CACTUS had lost 23 SBDs, 6 F4Fs, 8 TBFs



R4Ds evacuated 2,879 casualties



F4F — Grumman Wildcat

and 4 P-39s. An urgent plea brought 19 Wildcats up from Efate. Ironically enough, they arrived while Henderson was undergoing an aerial attack and although the flight leader's tanks were low on fuel, he set out after the Japanese bombers and downed four of them before turning back.

With the Japanese attack momentarily stopped, replacements began to pour into Guadalcanal to relieve the exhausted Cactus personnel. The new replacements were eager to do good. There were many instances of remarkable teamwork and indi-

vidual accomplishments.

On 7 November BGen Louis Woods arrived on the island to relieve BGen Geiger and four days later the first air raid in weeks resulted in a great many losses to the enemy.

On the 13th, the US and Japanese naval forces began to exchange salvos and the Battle of Guadalcanal was on. Gen MacArthur sent up 8 P-38s to join in the fight and on 14 November, every plane that could fly was loaded with ordnance and took off to attack enemy shipping. By evening, seven transports had been sunk and several damaged seriously. Of the 10,000 troops the enemy planned to land, only about 4,000 ever reached the shore.

The result of the mid-November strike was a victory for the US air and naval forces. To be sure, much fighting remained to be done at Guadalcanal, but the tide had turned in favor of our forces. The holding of the island was now assured. On 26 December, BGen Woods was replaced by BGen Francis

P. Mulcahy, and more squadrons — Marine, Navy and Army - arrived and departed making the air operation as bewildering as ever. Eight B-17s of the 11th and 5th Bombardment Groups arrived to perform long-range reconnaissance for future The 339th Fighter operations. Squadron supplied P-38s and the 3d Reconnaissance Squadron of the Royal New Zealand Air Force arrived with their Lockheed Hudsons. On the ground the perimeter defenses were expanded and provided with depth. Supplies were no longer

Fighting continued sporadically until February, 1943, with Marine losses at 1,044 and Army losses at 550. The Japanese loss was 14,800 killed or missing and 9,000 dead of disease. Cacrus downed 427 enemy aircraft while losing only 118 them-

The sanguinary fight for Guadalcanal is primarily the story of the foot Marine and soldier against fantastic odds. It does not reflect on their efforts that the air arm also made history. The situation was a mutual one. The ground troops were necessary to secure and hold the airstrip. The airmen were necessary to help the ground troops in carrying out its mission and one could not have existed without the other.

Guadalcanal was unique. It was the first offensive move for the US in WWII. It was offensive in nature, but its very character was defensive. A series of well-fought defensive battles made Guadalcanal an offensive victory.

It will go down in the annals of history as one of the most decisive battles ever fought.

Ed: Readers interested in reading more on this subject should read: "History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II" by Robert Sherrod.

RHIP

THE TIME WAS EARLY 1942. The place was one of the remote islands.

The brash, young Lieutenant (jg), assistant regimental surgeon, was lamenting his fate. Expansion had brought fast promotion to his Marine contemporaries. Some had been promoted twice in 6 weeks and several of his former juniors were now one grade senior. He asked his messmates for help in getting out of the Navy and into the Marine Corps so that he too might get along more rapidly.

The regimental commander was not amused. He said, "Young man, I'll have you know that I was a

1stLt for 11 years.'

After a thoughtful silence, the doctor made the reply that got him transferred the next morning. "Well, sir," he said, "maybe we're both in the wrong racket."

Col A. M. Fraser





2dLt David R. Wilson, honor graduate of the 4-58 Basic Class, was awarded the Marine Corps Association sword by BGen V. H. Krulak, Director, MCEC, Quantico, Va.



Lt Wilson was graduated from the University of California at Berkeley and commissioned through the NROTC program. He has been assigned to the 3d Mar Div.

Now being outfitted with the Mark IV flight suit, VMF-251 at MCAS, El Toro, Calif., will become the first Marine squadron to receive the light-weight, full-pressure suits.



Blue-green in color, the rubberized suit is completely airtight and contains a control system to govern ventilation, pressure and the pilot's oxygen supply.

A fishbowl helmet fastening to a metal neck ring completes the seal.

Using a system called Submarine Celestial Altitude Recorder, a submerged submarine can pinpoint its position.

Produced by Sperry Rand Corporation, the system allows a submarine to take a celestial fix from periscope depth. When the moon, sun or a star is sighted, the exact altitude of the celestial body is computed automatically, giving the angle of the sighting and the exact time.

Col F. T. Evans, the oldest Marine Corps aviator, and 2dLt John H. Ditto, the youngest pilot in VMF-235, compared the sparsely equipped cockpit of 44 years ago with that of a modern supersonic fighter when the retired flier made a recent visit to MCAAS, Beaufort, S. C.



Col Evans, who was the fourth aviator in the Corps, entered flight training in 1915 when flying machines were equipped with only a tachometer and a piece of string to indicate when the craft was slipping or skidding.

The Marine Corps' fourth annual Staff Noncommissioned Officer Symposium will be held Aug 9-15 at MCAS, Cherry Point, N. C.

Attending will be some 30 staff NCOs and their wives to consider a wide range of subjects, with emphasis on enlisted personnel matters. Transition from FJ4 Furies to 1,000-mph-plus Crusaders is being made in VMF-232 at MCAS, Kaneohe, Hawaii.

First of the Chance Vought fighters arrived in Hawaii late in February to make the squadron the first based outside the continental United States to be equipped with the Crusader.

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An all-weather helicopter, the HU2K-1, is entering production for the Navy by Kaman Aircraft Corporation.



The basic helicopter is designed to accomplish such missions as rescue, carrier plane guard, litter evacuation, moving externally slung cargo, personnel transport and observationreconnaissance.

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The first 4 of a series of 13 repackaged, helicopter-transportable radio equipments have been delivered to the 2dRadioCo, Camp Lejeune. The AN/TRD-4, direction finder, mounted in the Craig Helicop Hut, Model 150, results in a 40 per cent saving of both weight and cube over the old style equipment.



In addition to being helicoptertransportable, detachable dollies may be used to position the equipment after delivery to the helicopter site. This will result in a substantial reduction in 21/2-ton-trucks required in the companies at present. The remainder of the repackaged equipment is scheduled for delivery and testing under field operating conditions late this summer.

THE CASE OF THE WANDERING... 'SUBSCRIBER'





MISSING PERSONS

963 Subscribers to the Marine Corps GAZETTE

Age: 17 to 50


Occupation: U. S. Marine




Missing from the files of the Marine Corps GAZETTE—the whereabouts of 963 subscribers. They were last seen looking for the mailman to deliver their current copies of the GAZETTE.


REWARD: Prompt delivery of the GAZETTE wherever you may be stationed. Notify the Marine Corps GAZETTE, Box 1844, Quantico, Va. Forward your old address (label from the GAZETTE preferred) and your new address. Don't take a chance on missing a single copy. Remember, to collect the reward, the old address as well as the complete new address must be forwarded to the Marine Corps GAZETTE.














MADAGASCAR LANDING

By LtCol C. A. Phillips, USMC (Ret)







MajGen Robert G. Sturges, Royal Marines

A DESTROYER AND 50 ROYAL Marines, rushed by an admiral and a general into battle at the crucial hour, proved the axiom that daring and surprise are all-powerful factors in war. The strategy turned the tide of battle for the Naval Base at Diego Suarez, in Madagascar, and concluded with victory, OPERATION IRONCLAD (conducted by the British in WWII).

The victory also served to boost the morale of the Allied nations. Wake, Hong Kong, Singapore, Borneo, Sumatra, Java—all had fallen to the seemingly invincible Japanese. Here in May 1942, at last, was an Allied amphibious success.

Winston Churchill and the London staffs conceived the operation to forestall the probability that the Vichy-held, 900-mile-long island off the east coast of Africa would fall into the hands of the Japanese. Its strategic advantage as a submarine and bomber base for harassing shipping to India and Australia had to be denied the enemy. At the key

harbor of Diego Suarez, on the northern tip of the island, was a naval base manned by Vichy French naval and military forces (estimated at a few thousand troops — French and colonials, including the hard-fighting Senegalese). The operation was made possible in May 1942, earlier than expected, by the action of President Roosevelt and the US Navy Department in making available a replacement battleship and other vessels.

The British Task Force was

headed by MajGen Robert G. Sturges, Royal Marines. The Task Force was composed of the battleship Ramillies; the carriers Illustrious and Indomitable; the cruisers Hermione and Devonshire; 11 destroyers and several corvettes; along with minesweepers, assault ships, a fleet oiler and the transports. The transports had 10,000 Army, infantry and Commandos on board. The force arrived off the west coast of the peninsular tip on 3 May, rendezvousing off Courrier and Ambararata bays which lie roughly 20 miles across the peninsula from Diego Suarez harbor. On the afternoon of D-1, the cruiser Hermione was detached and sailed around the tip of the peninsula, thence south to take up position (for diversionary action) well off Suarez Bay.

The ships took position for entrance. As nightfall came, the minesweepers went into action in the narrow and tortuous channels. The French had considered these bays immobilized for ship landings. The corvette Auricula was "holed" up forward and sank while in tow. The ships, ranging up to the S.S. Franconia of 20,000 tons, felt their way through the treacherous channels, nosed into the swept roadstead and came to anchor. The ships' captains accepted this risk and were able to

thread the circuitous course without grounding or striking a reef, thus contributing to the rapid debarkation of troops.

The assault proceeded according to plan, zero hour being at 0430 on Tuesday, 5 May. The flotillas, with their landing troops of the 29th Brigade and the Commandos, started shoreward shortly after 0200, landing at 6 beaches in the 2 bays. The crew of a coast defense battery of four modern 6-inch guns was taken by surprise and captured.

At 0440 star shells from the cruiser *Hermione*, on her diversionary mission off Diego Suarez 25 miles to the east, signaled the attack. The Commandos worked inland unopposed, captured their first object, the village of Diego Suarez, and within a few hours had secured a wide area on the western (inboard) shore at Diego Suarez Bay.

Meanwhile, the main body had been streaming ashore so that by 0620, 2,400 men were in column advancing across the dusty peninsula toward Antsirane. A few tanks had come ashore in LCVs, and these, along with a few trucks with light mountain guns and ammunition, had taken up support of the column. Gen Sturges, 50 years of age, "tall and spare," with over 30 years of service, established his CP ashore. He

had had earlier service at the Dardanelles. His chief-of-staff was a Marine also, LtCol J. L. Moulton.

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The critically needed *Bachaquero*, a tanker converted into a kind of LST, had trouble finding an unloading beach. In her holds and on deck were the majority of the guns, tanks and vehicles.

In the advancing column the men of the 29th hauled ammunition and supplies in ammunition carts—grueling work as the heat of the day increased. There was little resistance during the early forenoon across the 18 miles of dusty peninsula. However, the tall grass on the route soon was catching fire from artillery shells. The smoke added a nuisance factor as to visibility, with men and equipment going astray.

Concurrently with the opening of the attack, planes from 2 carriers bombed the airdrome 6 miles to the south of Antsirane and knocked out the few enemy planes. At first light, the Fleet Air Arm planes took off with dummies stuffed to look like soldiers, which they dropped by parachutes in the inaccessible country about Mahagaga. This ruse drew some French troops from the main attack

The secrecy with which the Landing Force got ashore—and the column's advance several miles toward



its objective without discovery by the defenders-points up the effectiveness of the diversionary tactics. It wasn't until 1100 that the French were aware of the direction of the main attack. At that hour, however, their defense took shape, extending outward from 2 forts, with 2,000 vards of connecting trench located 3 miles to the south of the naval base at Antsirane. Snipers and machine gunners in forward positions covered the road to harass and delay the British column. Meanwhile, French 75s started shelling the tanks and disabled 4 in short order.

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
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At 1415, 7 more tanks, under Capt P. L. Palmer of the 10th Royal Hussars, arrived in the area and the advance was continued. In trying to locate the enemy who had stopped the earlier tanks, Capt Palmer ordered his tanks off the road. He then deliberately moved his own tank into the open to draw fire. It was hit, and Capt Palmer was killed while assisting his wounded driver to cover. The remaining tanks resumed the advance but, under heavy 75mm fire, withdrew at 1800 in the failing light. By this time the main line of resistance had formed and the 29th Brigade was in full contact.

Notwithstanding the stiffening defense, the first day's accomplishments were considerable: the 29th had landed and marched 18 miles and was in contact; the Commandos had taken their objective; the airfield was neutralized. With "troops tired but tails up," the attack planned for daybreak on a 3-battalion front ought to bring success.

Next morning the situation had changed for the worse. It was perceived that the enemy position was based on two old but solid, well-concealed forts, joined by 2,000 yards of trench. The 75s in pillboxes could be fired down the road for 1,000 yards. The isthmus was flat with little cover. Brigadier Festing's tired 29th had started the second attack, even had taken some prisoners, but at daylight the enemy opened with the 75s and mortars and the attack was stalled.

The Bachaquero found a beach and got the guns and tanks ashore. Due to the impassability of the road, the guns had to be sent to the Commando area, where the 19th Field Artillery took up position and



LtCol Phillips retired from the Marine Corps in 1955 after having served for more than 37 years. In addition to service with the 2d Mar Div in WWII and the 1st MAW in Korea, he has served at Guam, Virgin Islands, Nicaragua, China, Japan and Hawaii. Subsequent to his retirement he spent three years touring and living in Europe and Asia.

searched the enemy's rear. The battery and the main road came under enfilade fire by the French sloop D'Entrecasteaux. However, the sloop was sunk by a combination of artillery, aircraft and naval gunfire from the cruiser Hermione.

Another gain had taken place but Gen Sturges was unaware of it. The South Lancashire Regiment had advanced north through bush and mangroves during the night. Two companies and a battalion headquarters had gotten around the east flank of the enemy and captured some of his artillery, machine gun and mortar positions. However, messages sent via their man-pack wireless sets could not get through to headquarters, and runners were cut off. A noonday estimate at the command post presumed that this two-and-a-half company force had been captured.

During the forenoon the landing of the troops of the 17th was slowed down by a strong wind which buffeted the flat-bowed landing craft. Mines were still a hazard. In the afternoon a mine exploded in the sweep of the minesweeper *Poole*, severely wounding her First Lieutenant. He later died of his wounds and was buried at sea.

Gen Sturges was confronted with a formidable situation. The French 75s and machine guns had his 29th Brigade pinned down. Actually the killed and wounded were nearly 400—enough, but he thought he had lost 25 per cent of his crack brigade. There was little cover and a frontal attack in the daylight would further decimate his force.

Pressing for a quick decision, Gen Sturges issued orders for a night assault. The 17th Infantry Brigade was to leapfrog the 29th, using the only concealment they had — darkness. The men of the 17th were tired from their overland march to the MLR.

After giving the plan of attack to

Brigadiers Festing and Tarleton, Gen Sturges hurried back aboard the Ramillies to confer with Adm Syfret. The General summed up the discouraging outlook and then asked if the Admiral would land 50 Royal Marines by destroyer in the rear of the enemy at the naval base of Antsirane. The General felt that even if the destroyer was lost, the diversion would draw the enemy's fire and give the main night attack the best possible chance of success.

Adm Syfret immediately agreed to the proposal and designated the destroyer Anthony, commanded by LtCdr John M. Hodges. It was then 1430. The Anthony would have to steam 100 miles around the tip and down the east coast and, with all daring, try to run into Diego Suarez Bay, there to get the Marines ashore to coordinate the attack with the brigades at 2030. The attack must be carried out before the moon rose at 2300.

Capt Martin Price, Royal Marines, 31 years old with 13 years of service, was the commanding officer of the Marine Detachment on the *Ramilies*. At 1430 an orderly called him.

"Wondering what I had done," he recalled, "I reported to Gen Sturges."

The General gave him a rough sketch map of the town of Antsirane and the adjoining naval base and told him of the plan.

"Every Frenchman in Antsirane has a rifle and is pointing it in our direction. I want you to come around behind in the darkness and put him off his aim."

put him off his aim."

The objective was to take the quarters of the French commanding officer of artillery, which was one of the few buildings shown on the sketch-map. Capt Price had 45 minutes in which to organize for the seemingly do-or-die mission.

He lost no time in nominating the men of the 6-inch battery crews—50 of them—along with Lt Henry J. Powell. The other men of the ship's detachment and band hurriedly got together the 4 Lewis machine guns, the .50 cal anti-tank guns, the grenades and the ammunition.

The landing party meanwhile got into their full fighting order. In 45 minutes they were scrambling over the side into the destroyer *Anthony*.

Gen Sturges boarded a launch and started ashore for his CP as the destroyer cut loose at 30 knots to go north around the tip. On the flagship, Adm Syfret later reported that the next few hours were not happy.

"The impression left with me by Gen Sturges," he said, "was that the intended quick capture of Diego Suarez already was a 90 per cent failure. The night attack to be carried out by tired troops against very strong positions only had a 10 per cent chance of success. Prolonged operations, which we so much wished to avoid, were the unpleasant alternative."

He continued, "The Anthony's chance of success I assessed at about 50 per cent; my advisers thought 15 per cent; and of the Royal Marines, I did not expect a score to survive the night."

Indeed the bleak outlook must have weighed heavily on his mind. Six months of careful planning and training; marvelous secrecy; help by the United States; help by Gen Smuts in South Africa; help borrowed from Gen Wavell in India—a last-minute build-up of the landing force to 10,000—now it looked as if all this mighty work in the hope of a quick capture was going for naught.

This was the first big amphibious operation by the the British since the fateful Dardanelles campaign of 27 years before. Up to this point the model Madagascar operation had been the antithesis of Gallipoli. Now, without a quick victory, the campaign might settle down into a long, drawn-out affair—each day's killing of men on both sides brewing a little more bitterness between two normally friendly people—the British and the French.

The Anthony meanwhile was on her 100-mile dash. The long, gray, sleek ship did not slow down from her 30-knot speed even for the rough seas. Many of the Marines got seasick but, as the destroyer approached the harbor entrance, they recovered with the impending excitement.

As the Anthony hurtled nearer, the Hermione and the Devonshire, which that afternoon had been shelling the coast defenses, were steaming for the harbor entrance to screen her. Gun crews were alerted to shoot out any searchlights and to silence any cannon fire from the 4 batteries on the curve of the harbor entrance.

LtCdr Hodges, on the bridge of the racing destroyer, had only a rough sketch of the dock area. The night was extremely dark. The forts on the port side assuredly were blacked out and there was no visual guide on the starboard point. Because of the mine fields on the west coast it was reasonable for Hodges to presume that there were mines here, and a single hit from one of the 11-inch guns of the shore batteries could blow the *Anthony* apart.

As Hodges neared the channel he started the sonic depth finder (echo sounding apparatus), and by comparing the soundings with the depths on his navigational charts he did the remarkable feat, at 30 knots, of finding and remaining on course in the black, narrow channel. Nor did he falter when, abeam of the shore batteries, the 11-inch guns opened up at the point blank range of 600-800 yards. The destroyer was returning the fire when a searchlight bracketed the churning ship, but only for a minute or two. The Devonshire opened with 4-gun salvos of 8-inchers. On the second salvo the light went out. Once clear of the shore batteries the Anthony slowed down to conceal her wake.

Hodges was, no doubt, glad that the shore guns were stationary and couldn't track him. Once clear he was trying to divine the location of the quay for landing the Marines when further confusion was added by the firing of a 75mm field piece on the end of a jetty. The Anthony overshot the quay but speedily backed up, and the Marines lost no time jumping ashore over the stern with their equipment.

By this time the gun flashes and tracer shells, searching out the Anthony, were cutting the darkness as the destroyer fought her way back out. The stout-hearted captain, crew and ship, got clear at 2115.

The Marines had jumped from the frying pan into the fire and couldn't jump back. Although the dock yards, not far away, were on fire, the area around the quay was very dark. The Marines kept close together and filed along on the inboard side of a warehouse. Capt Price paused to risk turning on his flashlight to scan the map. He guessed that the next street to the left would lead to his objective-the quarters of the commanding officer of artillery. He had no sooner turned, at the head of the column, when a machine gun up the hill started firing in his general direction. The Marines hit the deck and, when the firing stopped, Capt Price changed his mind about going up that street. He changed course along some friendly walls. Proceeding onward, the captain could not orient himself by the map. He veered the column in what he supposed was the general direction of the objective.

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Lady Luck was riding with the group. Here was a steep hillside, and as the men clambered up and gained the top, they encountered a heavy, mesh wire fence. Working quietly the leading men broke it down, and a surprised sentry on a nearby platform bolted. Here was an orchard and beyond loomed up a building. It turned out to be a headquarters and an arsenal. The men surrounded the building; there was no sign of interference, so they started to open doors and search. Soon they were finding stacks of rifles, machine guns and stores of ammunition.

The next incident was dramatic. As the captain, with drawn pistol, and a half-dozen-men carrying rifles in their left hands and grenades in their right hands-stepped into a dimly lighted room they saw a telephone exchange. The operator, a French civilian, on seeing the armed-to-the-hilt British, gesticulated wildly and in French babbled into the mouthpiece of the switchboard. It turned out that he was frenziedly warning all command posts that a terrifying force of the enemy had landed. Having done his duty he turned around and surrendered.

Meanwhile, tracer firing was directed at the headquarters. Think-

ing that the British Commandos had crossed the bay, the captain sent out a patrol under a corporal to search them out and tell them to to hold their fire, but the corporal only sighted French colonials, who kept up evasive action by running out of sight.

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A second patrol was sent out to start diversionary fires. By now the surrender trend among the French was gaining headway-Powell could hardly proceed from block to block but for squads and groups coming up to surrender. The telephone operator had done a good job. Powell sent back prisoners but kept on with his mission of setting fires to distract the enemy "to get him off his aim."

The houses were stubborn. Finally Powell and his men got a fire set in the kitchen of one, rushed out into the courtyard and to their amazement they saw, wedged into the roof, a crashed Royal Navy airplane with its racks full of bombs. The men scrambled back and managed to put out the fire that had been so hard to start.

Powell's men next hit a French barracks, overcoming resistance with a couple of grenades. Shortly afterward a bugle sounded a spirited call. The call was Cease Fire. The French were particular how they surrendered.

By 0400 the Marines with some 500 prisoners joined forces with the advancing men of the Brigades. The mission had been accomplished.

As daylight heightened, the Captain found the cooks of the French artillery barracks. After breakfast the Marines spruced up and formed in platoon-front in the little parade ground. As the Senegalese in their horse-drawn transport came abreast, the Marines presented arms. The Senegalese executed an eyes left and the commanders returned the salute of the Marines. Afterwards the enlisted turned in their arms; the French officers requested permission to go to their homes and families. Capt Price, in a quandry, ended up by granting permission.

Gen Sturges had already established his headquarters at a nearby bank building. When Capt Price reported, the General poured out 2 gin and bitters, raised the glass in salute and remarked dryly, "Here

is your reward . . . you've earned it!"

Mopping-up operations secured the peninsula and during the day the Ramillies and several ships from the west coast came into the harbor. Earlier that morning a submarine on the surface was spotted off Diego Suarez. Fleet Air Arm planes bombed and sank it. It developed later she was the French submarine Le Heros, which had left Diego Suarez on 1 May and was unaware of the attack.

The formal surrender and signing of papers at the residency took place the following day. Because of the division of commands-Army, Navy and Area Administrator-it was difficult to know who had jurisdiction for the surrender.

On the next day Mr. Churchill radioed Adm Syfret and Gen Sturges

"I congratulate you cordially upon the swift and resolute way in which your difficult and hazardous operation was carried through. Pray give all ranks my best wishes and tell them that their exploit has been of

real assistance to Britain and the United Nations."

An untoward incident came about 3 weeks later when, in the harbor, the Ramillies was struck by a torpedo, with severe underwater damage. A second torpedo sank a nearby tanker. As the Ramillies was about to get underway for Durban for drydock a midget submarine was found aground on the beach. A patrol located her two-man crew which was Japanese. The midget had been launched at the entrance of the harbor from a large submarine.

The casualties for the campaign totaled 105 officers and men killed in action, 284 wounded and 4 missing in action. The 29th Brigade continued the action to the south. They were later joined by the 22d East African Brigade. The capital of Tananarivo fell on 22 September 1942. The Governor General and staff evacuated to the south, were pursued, and on 5 November accepted surrender terms, thus ending the whole Madagascar operation.

US MC


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MISSILE AGE MAP SYMBOLS

HQMC, WASHINGTON, D. C.— The modern age of missiles has brought about big changes in the field of modern warfare. Most of these changes are good. But in one area it appears that someone might have gone a bit too far.

The area I refer to is the area of definitions and the related area of map symbols.

Take, for example, the definition of antiaircraft artillery. The book says "weapons and equipment for actively combating aerial targets from the ground."

Since missiles are weapons, the term antiaircraft artillery, by definition, appears to include antiaircraft artillery missiles.

Yet in much of the literature today, you will find a clean-cut differentiation between antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft artillery missiles, as though they were separate entities, whereas actually one is part of the other.

I suggest that the term antiaircraft artillery be used in all cases to express the function of combating aerial targets from the ground. Regardless of whether the weapon is a gun or a missile, the function is antiaircraft artillery; so why make a differentiation?

What we are interested in is not so much the weapon as the idea of combating aerial targets from the ground. This is the essence of anti-aircraft artillery. Regardless of what weapon we are using, missile or gun, antiaircraft artillery is still antiaircraft artillery; we are still combating aerial targets from the ground.

In some quarters the basic term antiaircraft artillery is even being replaced by new missile-age terms such as air defense artillery (ADA). The new term is posed as a necessary

replacement for the basic term "antiaircraft artillery." The proponents of the term "air defense artillery" explain this by saying that the advent of missiles requires the new term because the antiaircraft artillery mission now includes anti-missile defense. But a look at the definition of antiaircraft artillery makes one wonder whether the term, air defense artillery, is actually required, since antimissile defense appears to fall within the definition of combating aerial targets from the ground. An aerial target is still an aerial target, regardless of whether it is a missile or a conventional aircraft. You can't change the idea of an aerial target merely by changing its conformation, speed, or mode of propulsion. It is still an aerial target, and antiaircraft artillery is still the means for combating it.

So much for definitions. A related area is that of map symbols.

For example, the basic map symbol for antiaircraft artillery is shown as Figure 1 (see key, next column). Yet with the advent of the missile as the newest antiaircraft artillery weapon, it appears that somebody decided to add a new symbol for AAA missiles (Figure 2).

I fail to see the need for the additional AAA symbol. We are still combating aerial targets from the ground. It is still AAA. So, I say, let's keep the traditional symbol (Figure 1), for all AAA units, whether armed with AAA guns or AAA missiles.

If we wish also to indicate the organic weapon of a particular type of AAA unit, why make a new symbol? Why not just use an appropriate subscript under the basic AAA symbol, as shown in Figures 3, 4 or 5?

Similarly, for field artillery, the missile age has brought an unnecessary additional map symbol. The traditional symbol for field artillery (Figure 6) now means only FA guns. A new missile age symbol has crept in to indicate FA missiles (Figure 7); very similar to the symbol for AAA missiles.

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
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This may appear trivial, but I maintain that the situation could easily develop into something quite confusing. Consider a man looking at a situation map. Is it not true that he is interested more in the functional aspects of the units depicted than in the type of weapons (missile or gun) with which armed? He wants to know, at a glance, the dispositions of the infantry, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, etc., units.

He can do it easily, even under adverse conditions, if Figure 8 means infantry, Figure 6 means field artillery, and Figure 1 means antiaircraft artillery, etc.

But with the same basic symbol being used for both field artillery missiles and antiaircraft artillery missiles, he will tend to be confused, even in clear daylight conditions.

Key to Figures



All such confusion can be avoided if we simply stick to the traditional symbols based on functional aspects. If we don't stick to these symbols based on functions rather than weapons, we may run into trouble on the situation map before too long. Is it not entirely conceivable that future warfare might be fought with even the infantry armed with short-range missiles? The symbol for such infantry units, if we follow the scheme used above, would probably be something like Figure 9 or 10.

By then, of course, aviation will have abandoned its guns for missiles and its symbol will be Figure 11 or

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Likewise, tanks will have traded their guns for missiles and will have a new symbol, Figure 13; and cavalry will be Figure 14. Chemical, in order to get the necessary accuracy and range, will use missiles, and its symbol will be Figure 15.

Summarizing the above, the pertinent part of the new FM 21-30, in abbreviated form might look like

this:

Antiaircraft Artillery

Armor

Aviation

Chemical

Engineer (non-missile)

Field Artillery

A person looking at a map would therefore see the same basic symbol (Figure 16) repeated all over the map, regardless of whether it indicates aviation, antiaircraft artillery, armor, chemical, field artillery, or infantry. Only the non-missile engineer outfits would have a unique symbol.

Obviously, such would defeat the primary purpose of the basic symbol: to indicate the basic function of the unit represented; ie., infantry, artillery, etc.

I say, before it is too late, let's scrap the new symbols in Figures 2 and 7, and use instead the basic symbols in Figures 1 and 6, appropriately annotated by subscript to indicate the type of organic weapon. Thus we would have something similar to:

Light Antiaircraft Missile

MAAM

Medium Antiaircraft Missile

HAAM

Heavy Antiaircraft Missile

HONEST John

HJ

Little John

LJ

Lacrosse

LAC

Later, as infantry missiles become operational, they could be indicated similarly by using the traditional basic infantry symbol with an appropriate subscript, such as Figure 17 for Red Ear.

In this manner, the map would readily show the locations of the various types of combatant elements, rather than displaying the fact that all combatant elements on the entire battlefield are armed with missiles. Is it not true that, in the missile age, the man reading the map will already know that all elements are using missiles? Then, why do we need to tell him what he already knows? Why not tell him what he doesn't know: where are the infantry, field artillery, armor, antiaircraft artillery, etc?

By using the traditional symbols, he can tell, at a glance, that the infantry is where Figure 18 appears, the field artillery is where there is a Figure 6 symbol, the armor is where there is a Figure 19 symbol, the AAA is where there is a Figure 1 symbol, etc.

If he should be interested also in the organic weapons, he could read the symbol subscripts: HJ, RE, LAAM, HAAM, LAC, etc.

Now is the time to correct this matter, since, thus far, only the symbols in Figures 1 and 6 have been invaded. I say, let's stamp this idea out now, before it becomes intrenched in any other map symbols.

Missile age warfare is complicated enough as it is. Let's not complicate it further by making the situation maps harder to read because all types of combat elements are indicated by the same basic symbol (Figure 16), overworked to the point of uselessness.

LtCol J. H. Tatsch

HIGH PRICE OF DRILL

2D MAR DIV, CAMP LEJEUNE, N. C. — Some time ago Maj F. H. Campbell wrote a letter to Message Center entitled "I Take Issue" (GAZETTE: Aug '58), which reached the heart of the problem, or issue, or confusion, of the drill for foot troops.

He concludes with, "If the drill is a burden, (and it most assuredly is) why not . . . return to the less complicated LANDING PARTY MANUAL drill?" The 13-man drill, since its advent in the Marine Corps Drill Manual of 26 June 1956, was a cumbersome overload for the majority of the Corps' units. Headquarter's decision to revert once again to the 8-man drill has not materially lightened this load. The 8-man "cavalry" type drill, like its 13-man cousin, is another nicety and, if expertly executed, a thing of beauty. But like any other nicety, luxury, or thing of beauty, one must be able to afford it before attempting to own it.

Just what is the price of this luxury? It's manifold. For a ship's detachment, it's space; for the independent duty man in a small unit, lack of fellow participants; for the recruiters, I&I staffs, district headquarters, professors of naval science and tactics, and major supply installations, it's the lack of time allotted in training schedules plus the normal day's business. For the guard detatchment the price is time which is hard to forgo considering manning levels, normal additional functions of honors, parades, etc.; for the FMF line unit, time once again which could be devoted to the learning, testing and developing of amphibious techniques, which are our life blood; to the support activities, again time, which must be devoted to the on-the-job training of specialists combined with general military training and at the same time, servicing their customers.

So then the price of this nicety is, for the greater part of the Corps, the devotion of time to obtaining a luxury, which time could be better devoted to the pursuit of missions.

Special drill teams such as at 8th and Eye and extra-curricular teams which are always pleasing the American public can, at their desire, use the "mounted" type drill, 8 or 13-man. They can and undoubtedly will learn it after hours or on specially allotted time as they have the "jazz" drill in the past. If these special drill teams desire to employ this form of foot drill for show, it can be a thing of beauty.

But in the lion's share of the Corps' organizations this drill is a weighty burden which, instead of becoming more operable and enjoyable, has not improved and now with another change in procedure will not improve for some time to come, if then. The shortcomings of having men mentally loaded with 3 distinctly different types of drill are obvious.



Add to this the fact that there are different sets of movements for each position in the formation, and the man in ranks is stumped. Further compound these problems with local ground rules so common in every Marine Corps organization and our once spectacular parades and cere-

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monies are losing their punch and precision. We have reduced the Marine, who once took pride in his unit on parade, to a point where he looks forward with considerable apprehension to any forthcoming ceremony.

Two facts point up the error in our attempts to depart from a uniform, simple yet precise drill system. The first is the decision to go back to the 8-man drill which was the interim measure between the LPM and the 13-man drill. The other is the ever increasing number of rehearsals which take place prior to any upcoming parade or ceremony. These rehearsals are necessary due to lack of practice, ineffectiveness of practice and the departure from practiced routine for the purpose of the ceremony.

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Drill for foot troops under the LPM and the 1956 drill manual had several common purposes. The 8man drill will be aimed at these same targets. Some of these are to provide an efficient and orderly method of moving troops from one place to another, to develop command presence, to afford junior officers and NCOs an opportunity to command troops, and to provide effective formations and maneuvers for ceremony. The criteria for "simple formations from which combat formations may be readily assumed" obviously is no longer of importance as the 8-man drill and the rifle squad T/O are not compatible. All of the above objectives are effectively accomplished by the drill as set forth in the LANDING PARTY MANUAL and the LPM drill has proven easier to learn and teach, easier to remember and does not require the participant to relearn every time he changes position in ranks. This last factor is of considerable importance in the light of the popular practice of organizing units for parade and ceremony not by rank or billet but by size.

In summary then, the Corps has taken an important step in its training program, a step back toward a tried and tested efficient drill system. But before expending more man hours and money training drill instructors, troops and officers, let's give serious consideration to taking one further step, the step to accepting the Landing Party Manual drill.

Capt MacDonald Green



FLYING TIGER: Chennault of China ROBERT LEE SCOTT, JR.

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The Chinese called him "Chennote Chiang Chun" and they called his men "Tigers." He was a soft-spoken retired US Army Air Corps captain when he came to China in 1937 and accepted the overwhelming task of reorganizing Chiang Kai-shek's pitiful flying force. How Claire Chennault forged a handful of pilots and a hundred obsolete planes into one of the most effective fighting units of all time is told by BGen Robert Lee Scott, Jr., USAF (Ret), who was one of those Tigers. The Introduction is by Gen George C. Kenney, USAF (Ret).

Doubleday & Co., N.Y. \$3.95

THE ANGRY SCAR: The Story of Reconstruction HODDING CARTER

In this narrative history Hodding Carter, Pulitzer Prizewinning editor, reviews the tumultuous years of the Reconstruction. Written in terms of people — Northerners and Southerners — The Angry Scar stresses the social, economic and political aspects of the Reconstruction. Among its source materials are the diaries, letters and newspaper accounts of the time. This is another volume in the Mainstream of America Series, edited by Lewis Gannett.

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The complicated and often contradictory attitudes and emotions which have swept Egypt since the days of Napoleon have left a century and a half of haphazard efforts, forced measures and abortive risings. Out of this chaos Nasser's Egypt and the Arab Federation have emerged, an explosive amalgamation of poverty, frustrated nationalism and hatred of the West. In this history, already hailed in France, the authors discuss the social, religious, economic, political and cultural factors that underlie Egypt's revolution and rise to power.

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THE TANKS, 1914-1945 (2 volumes) CAPT B. H. LIDDELL HART

This history of the Royal Tank Regiment was commissioned by the Regiment's Historical Committee and is a monumental work covering 40 years of struggle for the fulfillment of a new Although Britain followed up her initial lead after WWI by evolving and developing the principles on which armor should be used, her own success with the tank was not striking. These books tell why this was so. This is a history, a textbook, a fascinating story -and a salutary lesson. It should be of interest to all those who are or were connected with armor, and to those for whom warfare is a subject of study. The Foreword is by Viscount Montgomery of Alamein.

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., N.Y. \$15.00

THE LAST NINE DAYS OF THE BISMARCK

C. S. FORESTER

On 18 May 1941 the Bismarck was in the harbor of Gdynia, making ready to proceed to sea after a prolonged period of training in the Baltic. At 42,000 tons she was the world's largest, most dangerous, most modern ship of war yet launched. The British Admiralty learned it as she slipped out of the dockyards, and an alert RAF navigator spotted her a few hours later. A desperate gamble had begun: the pursuit of the Bismarck. In preparing this volume, Mr. Forester spent weeks with the records of the Admiralty, and interviewed scores of persons

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UNIFORMED SERVICES ALMANAC

Compiled by LEE E. SHARFF, WAYNE HAWKINS and JOSEPH YOUNG

Here is compiled in one booklet the benefits to which the military are entitled. In a clear, easy-to-read style, the editors have presented all legislation, pending and past, which affects the serviceman. In addition, pertinent statistics are also provided. Although not to be considered an official document, the editors have researched the material from official sources. This is the 1959 edition of the almanac. Apparently it will be an annual affair inasmuch as it is announced that the 1960 edition will be published in January 1960.

Federal Employees' News Digest \$1.00

Federal Employees' News Digest Washington D. C.

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Philosophical Library, N.Y.

\$4.75



RADM SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, USNR (Ret). 445 pages, maps, charts, index, illustrations. Little, Brown & Co., Boston. \$6.50

Leyte: June 1944-January 1945 is the twelfth volume in his history of US naval operations in WWII, by Samuel Eliot Morison, Harvard's great naval historian. For the twelfth time since 1947—when his first volume in the series appeared—Sam Morison has done it again.

After a section devoted to preliminaries (and very important ones too, such as Peleliu), the book turns to the Leyte campaign, to which all but 112 of its 445 pages are devoted. Here again, another vital subdivision: the lion's share of space goes to the October 1944 battle for Leyte Gulf, the largest and surely one of the greatest naval battles of all time. It is Adm Morison's assured, beautifully organized, and exciting treatment of this complex of actions that makes this volume the outstanding work that it is. I have reviewed his earlier handling of Midway (Vol. II), of the desperate sea fights in the Solomons (Vol. V), and of the battle of the Philippine Sea (Vol. VIII) -all critical and complicated, to say the least. Leyte Gulf, as reported in this volume, tops them all.

You name it, Levte had it: a large amphibious landing, major carrier air operations, fierce and heroic destroyer actions against overwhelmingly stronger enemy, and that ultimate surface naval classic-an oldstyle battle line crossing an enemy "T." This last, the battle of Surigao Strait, was of special historical importance for two equally dramatic reasons: 1) the victorious US battle line was entirely composed of prewar battleships (5 out of 6 of whom had been sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor); and 2) the battle marked the final line-of-battle action in the history of naval warfare. That it was

also one of the best fought and crushingly decisive of its kind sounds a fitting knell for a tradition extending back to 1655 and well exemplified by such fights as Trafalgar, Tsushima, Manila Bay and Jutland. As Adm Morison writes, "... when Mississippi discharged her 12 14-inch guns at Yamashiro, at a range of 19,790 yards, at 0408 October 25,



1944, she was not only giving that battleship the coup de grace, but firing a funeral salute to a finished era of naval warfare. One can imagine the ghosts of all the great admirals from Raleigh to Jellicoe standing at attention as the Battle Line went into oblivion, along with the Greek phalanx, the Spanish wall of pikemen, the English longbow, and the row-galley tactics of Salamis and Lepanto."

But the Leyte Gulf battle included other striking actions and feats. US naval history can hardly match and surely not surpass the superb courage of the destroyers and DEs off Samar, who unhesitatingly tangled by day and at point-blank ranges with Japanese battlewagons and heavy cruisers. Or the masterly, coolheaded handling of the US escort carriers caught naked under the 8 and 14-inch guns of those same battleships and cruisers. This was the fighting Navy, the Navy of Jones, Preble, Hull, Porter, Farragut, and Dewey, of men such as the ship's company of USS Hoel (who dueled

for 65 minutes before being sunk, against battleships Yamato and Kongo and anything else that her two remaining 5-inch guns could reach). Of those men and that ship it was written in an action report:

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"Fully cognizant of the inevitable result of engaging such vastly superior forces, these men performed their assigned duties coolly and efficiently until their ship was shot from under them."

Reflecting the author's now considerable experience as a student of amphibious operations - at least from the naval viewpoint - Leyte presents effective pictures of the group of lightly opposed landing operations by the Army in the Philippines. These are in sharp contrast to the savagely contested assault on Peleliu by the 1stMarDiv, which, as noted, is also described in this volume. Here, as Marines, we might wish that Adm Morison had devoted more appropriate detail and length to the harder battle (Peleliu gets only 18 pages, the Leyte landings, 43). Also, that he had given an analysis of the seriously defective pre-landing naval gunfire bombardment at Peleliu (such as is found in Princeton's able U.S. Marines and Amphibious War). Incidentally, in his characterization of the Peleliu defenses, Adm Morison reverses course 180 degrees from a highly dubious generalization found in his Volume XI, regarding the Normandy beach fortifications (". . . the Germans had provided the best imitation of hell for an invading force that American troops had encountered anywhere. Even the Japanese defenses of Iwo Jima, Tarawa and Peleliu are not to be compared with these."). But in Leyte compare them he does, when, of Peleliu's fortifications he most correctly writes, "One shudders to think what would have happened if Hitler had built anything like this along his Atlantic Wall. . ."

You pays your money and you takes your choice.

Another doubtful generalization regarding land combat mars this volume, viz., "not since the Guadalcanal, Buna-Gona, or Bougainville campaigns had fighting been as arduous as on Leyte." This just isn't so. The campaigning may have been hard,

but nobody can seriously contend that Leyte's fighting could be compared in arduousness with that, say, on Tarawa, or in the Marianas, or on Peleliu.

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Leyte emerges as one of Morison's best. Its writing is racy and salty, its illustrations first-rate, and its maps and charts ably done. It presents the picture of a great naval battle which might seem more than the human eye and mind could compass, yet does this so simply and logically that the reader finds himself always in medias res and always in ready touch with all events as they unfold.

Reviewed by Col R. D. Heinl, Jr.

Ed: Col Heinl has been a lifelong student of naval history. He is now commencing a tour of duty as Chief of the United States Naval Mission to Haiti.

THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

GERHARD RITTER. 195 pages. Frederick A. Praeger, N.Y. \$5.50

For years the Schlieffen Plan has been held in awe as the magic scheme by which Germany could have scored a quick victory over France in 1914, had the plan been properly executed. In this book, for the first time, the mystery-shrouded plan is brought to light in its entirety.

The book traces the growth of the Schlieffen Plan from 1891 when Schlieffen became Chief of the German General Staff until his death in 1912. It is documented with the thoroughness typical of German historical scholarship. Most of Schlieffen's staff memoranda on the subject are reprinted here and elaborated upon in light of what is known of Schlieffen's character and personality. Author Gerhard Ritter makes no final judgment of the Plan's chances of military success, though B. H. Liddell Hart, in his introduction, states, ". . . Schlieffen's plan had a very poor chance of decisive success at the time it was conceived."

Schlieffen decided that to insure quick capitulation of France, German troops would have to sweep through the neutral Low Countries in a great turning movement behind the French border defenses. This premeditated disregard of neutrals' rights, says Ritter, "appears to be nothing less than the beginning of Germany's and Europe's misfortunes," culminating in the world's condemnation of German militarism

at Versailles and later at Nuremburg. The General Staff had gained such power that the foreign affairs of Germany were completely dependent upon the Staff's operational plans.

Readers will enjoy studying the Schlieffen Plan as a military scheme. This book will not settle the arguments as to the Plan's efficacy, had Moltke executed it in its entirety, but will furnish ammunition to those on both sides of the conflict.

More important, however, is the question of the political implications of a nation's military planning. Another distinguished German, Clausewitz, once wrote, "It is an inadmissible and even harmful distinction to leave a great military enterprise or its planning to a 'purely military' judgment; more, it is absurd to consult professional soldiers on a plan for a war in order that they may judge from a 'purely military' standpoint what cabinets are to do." Germany violated Clausewitz' warning, and, as Ritter concludes, "The outbreak of the war in 1914 is the most tragic example of a government's helpless dependence on the planning of strategists that history has ever seen."

Junior officers will find much of interest in *The Schlieffen Plan*, even though it is a study of war planning at its highest echelon. Senior officers will find it even more valuable.

Reviewed by Capt D'Wayne Gray

Ed: Capt Gray heads the Administrative and Production Section of the Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC.

THE MILLIONTH CHANCE

The Story of the R101
JAMES LEASOR, 244 pages, photog

JAMES LEASOR. 244 pages, photographs and index. Reynal and Company, NY. \$4.00

GRAF ZEPPELIN

The Adventures of an Aerial Globetrotter

J. GORDON VAETH. 235 pages, photographs and index. Harper and Brothers, NY. \$4.00

In the early twentieth century, several countries were interested in, and had varying degrees of success with, lighter-than-air craft. The French lost the *Dixmude* during a Mediterranean storm in 1923. The Italian *Italia* plunged in the Arctic ice in 1928. The British built their *R101* and its disastrous end we will review. The US fared little better. The *Shenandoah* crashed in 1925 in

Ohio; the Akron in 1933 and the Macon in 1935. Count Zeppelin of Germany started making and flying dirigibles in 1900 and his successors, including the famous Dr. Hugo Eckener, built and flew some 130 aircraft of this type, with only one major disaster, the Hindenburg in 1937 at Lakehurst, NJ.

The 2 books reviewed in joinder are opposites—success in pioneering commercial travel by zeppelin on the one hand and failure on the other. The skill and the know-how of the German zeppelin builders contrast sharply with the method and results of the other countries flying similar aircraft.

The R101 was the greatest airship of her time ever built. She was larger than an ocean liner. Her first voyage ended in one of flying's greatest disasters. The Graf Zeppelin's exploits on the other hand, provided the press and the public with some of the sensational news stories of the late 1920's and early 1930's. Her flights were commemorated by the postage stamps of a dozen nations.

Obviously, these 2 books are contemporary history of air travel and provide us with lessons. These books may not sell the Department of Defense on a research and development cosmic space dirigible project but they are interesting and instructive reading.

Mr. James Leasor, author of *The Millionth Chance*, was born in 1922, educated at the City of London School and Oriel College, Oxford. His painstaking and detailed research makes vivid his telling of the story of the creation of a great airship, the political reasons which hurried its testing, the lack of a scientific approach to construction, the bungling in high government circles, and the disaster to which all the foregoing contributed.

The R101 was 777 feet long: originally designed as a 732-foot airship, she was cut in half, lengthened and "sewed up" again. This was considered a necessary modification in order to insert more gas bags for greater lift. No 24-hour continuous flying test was ever completed. Yet, she was off for India via Egypt to inaugurate a passenger service aimed at bringing these parts of the British Empire closer together.

The R101 was built by the British

government, to wit the Royal Airship Works. About the same time, the R100, a companion airship, was built by private British enterprise and was successfully flown to Canada and back.

The R101 went out late in the day, Saturday, 4 October 1930, without having undergone a full speed trial. Shortly after 0200 5 October 1930 near Beauvais, France, the R101 was down in the field, burning. Fifty-four people set out in the R101: 6 passengers, 6 officials from the Royal Airship Works, and 42 officers and crew. Only 6 of these survived.

Mr. Leasor traces the incompatibility of political expediency and scientific experiment in his story of the R101. He makes no comments; he reports what happened, even including a chapter on seances. We assume that similar projects are handled better in these enlightened modern times.

J. Gordon Vaeth, the author of Graf Zeppelin, was born in New York City in 1921. He attended Roosevelt High School, Yonkers, and graduated from New York University. As an undergraduate, he wrote articles on dirigibles. This interest led him to a commission in the Naval Reserve and his assignment during WWII to Navy lighter-than-air commands. At present, he is Head of the New Weapons and Systems Division of the US Naval Training Device Center, Port Washington, Long Island.

A map of the major routes flown by the *Graf Zeppelin*, 1928 to 1937, covers the world. She made 590 flights for a total of 1,053,000 miles. The LZ-127, her alias, was 776 feet long, powered by 5 Maybachs engines, each in a small egg-shaped gondola suspended from the hull by

ladders, struts, and wires. She carried a crew of 43, and 20 passengers. Her captain was Dr. Hugo Eckener, scholar, psychologist, economist, newspaperman and renowned airman. The Graf Zeppelin under Eckener pioneered air passenger, mail, and cargo service; was first to fly weather pressure patterns; probed the mysteries of air currents and air resistance. Her trip around the world, her exploration of the Arctic, her Atlantic crossings are all graphically recreated in this book. To me the flight across Siberia in 1928 and the Arctic exploration to Franz Josef Land in 1931 were oustanding. Both of these give the reader a picture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics found in very few other writings . . . even if they did happen about 30 years ago.

This then is the biography of a most successful and well known aircraft and her great commander, Dr. Hugo Eckener. There is no tragic ending. The *Graf Zeppelin* was the safest of dirigibles although her seventh-of-a-mile long hull was filled with highly inflammable hydrogen.

The German know-how in building and operating aircraft of this type is cause for reflection. The outspoken Dr. Eckener, who did not conceal his anti-Nazi sentiments, is a personality said by all who knew him to be "unforgettable."

Of the 2 books, there is little to choose between them in readability. They are suitable companion pieces, contrasting success and failure in lighter-than-air flight. Both are pleasurable, informative, and easy reading.

Reviewed by BGen H. Nickerson, Jr.

Ed: BGen Nickerson is currently serving as Special Assistant to the Fiscal Director at HQMC.

THE YEARS OF THE SKY KINGS

ARCH WHITEHOUSE. 336 pages, illustrated. Doubleday & Company, N. Y. \$4.95 as a

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As contemporary air warfare becomes increasingly impersonal, it is somewhat refreshing to look back—not too far—at the war conducted in the skies during 1914-18. This book by Arch Whitehouse is a realistic and vivid account of the men who flew their fragile crates of fabric, wood and wire during those hectic years. It is also the story of the machines and the weapons, and how they developed during the wartime period.

Mr. Whitehouse is eminently qualified to write about the sky fighting of WWI. Not only has he been writing about it for some 40 years, but also he was a participant in it. This lends an autobiographical air to portions of the book. It is not unusual for a participant to have strong feelings about the events in which he took part, and also about the other people involved. Mr. Whitehouse is no exception. He is not reticent in praising or criticizing, and this adds a bit of additional flavor to his story.

This book is organized in chronological fashion with a chapter devoted to each year. (The years 1915 and 1918 get two chapters each, but there are mitigating circumstances.) Such a plan has the disadvantage of appearing somewhat jerky in spots, and there is a certain amount of repetition. On the other hand it has the advantage of tracing progress year-by-year, progress in the development of machines, weapons and men.

The author not only relates the exploits of the various airmen on both sides of the Great War, he evaluates a great many of them as well. But although Arch Whitehouse was in the Royal Flying Corps



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as an observer, and later a pilot, he does not separate his bouquets and brickbats according to the allegiance of the airmen. Allies receive both, as do the men of the Central Powers. Nor does he limit his discussion to the Western Front, but carries it to wherever there was military flying during the conflict.

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When it is chronologically correct to do so, author Whitehouse describes the aviation exploits of pilot Whitehouse. But these personal experiences are used solely when they have some bearing on the overall drama.

If there is one dominant personality throughout the book, it is Gen Hugh "Boom" Trenchard, who is regarded as the father of the Royal Air Force. Whitehouse makes no secret of his deep admiration for this man, and describes him as having the foresight early in the war to oppose the practice of pilots engaging in single combat in order merely to increase the score of downed planes. In describing Trenchard's arguments for a tactical and a strategic aviation organization, the author quotes him as saying, "These aerial duels are a waste of time and manpower. . . . It would be much simpler and more efficient to destroy the enemy's equipment long before it ever reaches a frontline hangar. One strategic bomber, a trained bomber crew and the proper type of armament would do more good in a week than all our multi-decorated aces can accomplish in a year."

All the nations making an aerial effort during WWI are covered here. But in relation to the amount of its participation, the United States is given a disproportionate amount of attention and space. Presumably this may be attributed to it being an American book aimed principally at an American audience. He makes the point that too many of the American sky fighters are no longer remembered, and were never given the recognition they deserved. He takes them up, name by name. In describing the exploits of the aerial Medal of Honor winners he includes two Marines, Lt Ralph Talbot and GySgt Robert Guy Robinson.

Within each year's period there are listed the planes manufactured by each country during that year, together with each type of engine, the

speed and purpose (fighter, bomber, etc.) of the plane. For those interested in statistics there is included a list of American aces (credited with 5 or more planes); a list of American aces who served with the RAF; a list of American aces who served with the French. The aces with 20 or more victories from Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Germany are also listed. As another "extra" the author includes a glossary of terms in popular use by aviators of WWI.


In his conclusion, Arch Whitehouse casts a jaundiced eye at the whole ace system.

"Today I find names in the ace lists that were never mentioned in the early 1920s. I have never noted that a name has been deleted from the list. . . How can one tell how many planes he shoots down in a dogfight? There isn't time to make sure that each one catches fire or is seen to crash. There isn't time for members of the flight to look on your handiwork and confirm your claims. . . . Many victories never were confirmed and many confirmed victories were erroneous. . . ."

The book is dedicated to "The thousands of unsung heroes of the Allied air services who never saw their names in the honors and awards lists." This seems highly appropriate.

Reviewed by LtCol John A. Crown

Ed: This officer is a student of WWI aviation and reviewed "They Fought for the Sky" by Quentin Reynolds in the Sept 1957 GAZETTE.



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SMOLENSK UNDER SOVIET RULE

MERLE FAINSOD. 484 pages. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. \$8.50

In the early days of the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia great numbers of hitherto secret documents fell into the hands of a Western power. At the close of the war much of this material was captured by American and British forces in Germany and thus was opened to the West the first real view of life under the Leninist-Stalinist regimes. One of the greatest post-war Allied accessions was the so-called Smolensk archive.

This collection of documents, comprising over 200,000 written pages, provides scholars with an unforget-table record of Russian experience as reflected in the life of a typical region (Smolensk Oblast) during the first 2 formative decades of Soviet rule. This opportunity to view the processes of regional and local government in the Soviet Union from the inside is unique in history,

as no comparative Soviet documentation is available in the West.

This is not a book for casual reading. It is a scholarly work devoted to presenting the salient materials from a singular mass of historically important documentation, and must be viewed as such. Yet, the author has never strayed far from the really important element in any such political-sociological study: "the ordinary human beings trying desperately to lead normal lives in the midst of extraordinary and abnormal events."



This effort to exploit the Smolensk archive necessarily has been adjusted to the limitations of the material available. As the German occupation forces had chosen at random the material to be confiscated, certain omissions and gaps appeared in the chronological sequence. This has, in turn, resulted in inadequate coverage (which the author acknowledges) of the role of industry and trade unions, churches and the courts of law. Particularly regretful to military readers is the paucity of data on the Soviet armed forces.

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The vantage point which he chose for his work puts major stress on political processes. Particular emphasis was put on the organization of authority in Smolensk Oblast, the way in which controls operated, and their impact on local inhabitants. This study is divided into 2 parts: the first concerns the structure of power in the area, while the second stresses the effects of controls on the people.

The reader becomes aware of the "constant pressure for ever-greater production, the struggle of ordinary people to survive at the barest margin of existence and the desperate expedients to which they were driven to make ends meet."

The largest part of the archive consists of Communist Party records of all types. Because the Party served as the source of authority in the region and its controls reached out in many directions, the documentation touches on almost every aspect of regional existence. The illumination which it sheds extends well beyond the boundaries of Smolensk. Professor Fainsod points out that analysts of the Soviet system have always found it difficult to draw a clear line between the functions of the Party and government. The archive demonstrates that "no clear distinction can be made. Soviet methods of rule were consciously constructed around overlapping, duplication and parallel functions.'

Professor Fainsod provokes the reader with the reminder "that the . . . facade concealed a host of inner contradictions, that the yoke which Communism imposed left its legacy of smoldering grievances, and that the suppressed aspirations of yesterday may yet become the seedbed for tomorrow's fierce debates."

Reviewed by Capt W. F. Alsop, Jr.

Ed: Capt Alsop completed 2 years of study at the Foreign Area Specialist Training Institute (Russian) in Germany. He is currently ISO at MCS, Quantico.

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
CAPT ALFRED TETENS. Translated from the German by Florence Mann Spoehr. 107 pages, illustrated, with introduction. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. \$3.75

For the Marines who spent part of their WW II and subsequent career in the Palau Islands, this little book of memoirs may prove of interest. It was written long before the conflicts of modern times had brought war to this far-off region and turned the islands of the South Pacific into air and naval bases, packed tight with troops, planes and military installations. In those days, Palau and Yap were virtually unknown, visited only by a few traders and adventurers.

Capt Alfred Tetens was a German sea captain and trader who sailed the Pacific in the 1860's, before Stevenson had settled in Samoa and by his writings made the world aware of the exotic beauty of the South Seas. From 1862 to 1868, when the islands were as yet untouched by civilization, Capt Tetens visited the Palaus and Yap. What he saw he carefully recorded in his journal and it is this journal that has been published. It describes a society and a way of life that Marines who visited the islands under less pleasant circumstances, had little opportunity to observe. They will read with interest, therefore, Capt Tetens' description of the customs of the islanders-their marriage and burial ceremonies, their methods of tatooing, and the secret rites of the native women.

Less than a century has passed since Alfred Tetens lived among the Palau and Yap islanders. During that time the islands have been owned by Spain, Germany, and, under mandate, by Japan. American troops took them from the Japanese in WW II and they are now a Trust Territory of the US, under United Nations trusteeship. The son of the Palau chief is a student at the University of Hawaii and a boy from Yap recently won a fellowship for study in the US. The world that Tetens described has long since disappeared, but his memoirs should prove of interest to all who have visited the South Pacific in more recent times.

Reviewed by Louis Morton Ed: From 1943 to 1945, Dr. Morton, PhD (Duke University, Class of '38), served as Historian, South Pacific Area for the War Department.



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HIGH TIDE AT GETTYSBURG

GLENN TUCKER, 462 pages, maps, annotated, bibliography, index. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis. \$5.00

There can hardly be a question that the Civil War is our most written about conflict, and the Battle of Gettysburg certainly has the palm for inspiring the most voluminous segment of that literature. It was clearly a decisive battle and its fascination for the military student is immense. After Meade's men held, the fortunes of the South took a permanent downturn; there were later Southern victories, to be sure, but none that had the power to restore the fortunes of the losers. To borrow the thesis of this book, "the Confederate cause was at high tide when it surged against the stone walls and Federal trenches on the crest of Cemetery Hill."

A new book about Gettysburg, however well written and researched, treads the same familiar ground and can only offer a fresh approach. Mr. Tucker leans most heavily on characterization, on establishing a man rather than a name as the leader of the various Union and Confederate fighting elements. He does, in fact, interrupt his battle narrative regularly to flash back, and ahead in some cases, to mold the colonels, the captains, and the generals as personalities. This writer's device, while it is well handled, is often quite distracting when it breaks the continuity of the narrative.

The author obviously feels he is in a position to sit in judgment on the characters he develops. And his judgments are harsh for many famous men, although no evaluation pro or con of any leading actor at Gettysburg can at this late date be anything but the distillation of the opinions of other critics. Longstreet, perhaps the most controversial character on the battlefield, is a respectable figure in Mr. Tucker's hands,

while other Southern officers like Ewell and A.P. Hill emerge as men unsuited for the leadership entrusted to them. For some reason. not apparent from the careful research documented in this story, Union leaders do not achieve the stature that Confederates do from Mr. Tucker's pen. While the claim is put forward that this is an impartial study, there seems an intangible attraction on the part of the author for the colorful Rebels, an attraction that does not always carry through as evenly when the subject is a Yankee.

Little need be said in a review about the actual ebb and turn of the fighting around the little Pennsylvania village. The facts of the battle have long been known; only the author's art influences the acceptance of his story as better than half a dozen, even half a hundred others that have appeared in the past decade. Mr. Tucker has written well as befits a man retired from a lifetime of work as a Washington newsman to a new career as an historian. He is observant and he has a sympathetic feeling for the men who created the history on his pages that so many scholars fail to achieve. Some of his battle passages are as good as any I've read; he has the gift of the born story-teller who can recreate the image of events as they happened. This book will perhaps be received better by the avowed Civil War buff than by the novice, but few military men in this country should have to classify themselves novices when the subject is Gettysburg.

Those who do most of their reading by looking at pictures will not be happy with this book. There are no illustrations and the maps are barely adequate, certainly not on a par with the skillful writing. But writing makes this book; the author is a professional and his text shows it. To a man with a strong interest in the Civil War this book will be fascinating and worth owning; to the more casual student of warfare in general it will furnish good reading and food for thought on problems of leadership.

Reviewed by Henry I. Shaw, Jr. Ed: Former Sgt Shaw, USMCR, now employed by Historical Branch, HQMC, is co-author (with LtCol F. O. Hough and Maj V. E. Ludwig) of Vol I History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in WWII, currently available at the GAZETTE Bookshop.



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